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Privacy and Personhood Revisited: 
A New Framework for Substitute 
Decisionmaking for the Incompetent, 
Incurably I11 Adult* 
Linda C .  Fentiman"* 
Introduction 
This is an essay about the nature of human personhood in a mod- 
ern, socially and technologically complex society. Its focus is the 
incompetent,' incurably ill2 adult3, and the question of how, and by 
* Copyright 1988 Linda C. Fentiman. 
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University; J.D. 1975, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School; L.L.M. 1983, 
Harvard University Law School. The author wishes to thank her colleagues Kate Nace 
Day, Victoria Dodd, Nancy Firak, Dwight Golann, Stephen Hicks, Michael Perlin, and 
Margaret Walsh for their comments on drafts of this Article, and gratefully acknowl- 
edges the research assistance and helpful criticism of John Hazelton, Jr., M.D., J.D.; 
Kathleen Isakson, Esq.; David Perry, Esq.; and Elizabeth Puopolo. 
1. "Incompetent," for purposes of this Article, is defined to mean incompetent to 
make a medical treatment decision. While this would obviously include an individual in 
a coma or in a persistent vegetative state, it also encompasses many patients who, 
although conscious, suffer from confusion or delusion, alternating with periods of lucid- 
ity, due to serious illness, pain, or pain medication. See, e.g, State Dep't of Human 
Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 207-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978). 
There is no universally applicable standard for incompetency because the test of in- 
competency must necessarily depend on the purpose for which the incompetency deter- 
mination is being made. Applebaum & Roth, Competency to Consent to Researc/z: A 
Psychiatric Overview, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951,956 (1982). Thus, it is not useful 
to talk about global incompetency; rather, a person may be incompetent to make a will, 
or to manage his financial affairs, or to make a medical treatment decison, without neces- 
sarily being incompetent to conduct many other aspects of daily living. Stromberg & 
Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the ~bfentalb Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 
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whom, medical treatment decisions for that adult should be made. 
Fundamentally, this essay seeks to identify both the justification for, 
and limits of, state power over the individual in the area of health 
care decisionmaking, and to define a sphere within which the indi- 
vidual, as a member of the human family, may choose the direction 
of his life and death. 
As we near the end of the twentieth century, we face a troubling 
paradox. At the very time that modern medical technology makes it 
possible to extend and sustain human life almost indefinitely, two of 
the most essential attributes of that life-individual self-determina- 
tion and the sharing of human connection-have been placed in 
jeopardy. Gone are the days when dying was a frequent event in 
everyday life, striking young as well as old, with its inevitability be- 
ing a respected and accepted fact of human e~is tence .~  Today, per- 
haps because death is less common, it is more feared,5 and indeed, 
one might argue that the ever-increasing armory of modern anti- 
death weaponry is itself testimony to our collective fear of death. 
In the last two decades, organ transplants, organ repairs (such as 
coronary bypass operations), and organ substitutes (such as respira- 
tors, ventilators, and renal dialysis machines) have, along with the 
development of major pharmacological treatments for a number of 
classic diseases of old age, made it possible to greatly extend the 
average person's life span. Currently, twelve percent of all Ameri- 
cans are over age sixty-five and twenty percent are expected to be so 
by the year 2030.6 Furthermore, the fastest growing segment of the 
elderly are those over seventy-five, who are much more likely than 
301 (1983); see also Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494-95, 495 N.E.2d 337, 342, 504 
N.Y.S.2d 74, 79 (1986) (holding that the fact that appellant was mentally ill and invol- 
untarily civilly committed was insufficient in itself to establish a lack of competence to 
make a medical treatment decision (citing Brooks, Constitutional Right to Refuse Anti- 
psychotic ~Medications, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179, 191 (1980))). The defini- 
tional problems of "incompetency" are compounded because it is both a medical and 
legal term that is often used with very different meanings by practitioners in these two 
fields. 
2. "Incurably ill" is used in this essay to identify not only those patients who have 
traditionally been labeled as "terminally ill," such as those suffering from a form of 
cancer for which no known cure exists, but also to describe those persons for whom 
death or a permanent loss of consciousness is reasonably medically certain, although not 
imminent. Persons in this category include stroke victims who have been in a coma for a 
long period of time and persons who are in a persistent vegetative state. For examples 
of such individuals, see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. 
3. The focus of this essay is limited to incompetent, incurably ill adults. No discus- 
sion of the special ethical problems surrounding decisionmaking for seriously ill chil- 
dren, including newborns, will be attempted here. 
4. Thomas, Dying As Failure, 447 ANNALS 1, 2-4 (1980), reprinted in J. AREEN, P. 
KING, S. GOLDBERG & A. CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 1077, 1078-80 (1984) 
[hereinafter LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE]. 
5. Id. 
6. John Beck, Epidemiology, Demography, and General Principles, Paper 
presented at Intensive Course in Geriatric Medicine and Board Review, American Col- 
lege of Physicians, in Beverly Hills, California 1 (Jan. 19-23, 1988) (copy on file at the 
George IVmhington Law Review); 3 M. PERLIN, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
5 18.03 (forthcoming 1989) (citing Farber, Petrakis & Bernadette, The Health Status Of the 
Older Population, in 1981 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, REPORT OF THE TECHNI- 
CAL COMMITTEE ON HEALTH MAINTENANCE & HEALTH PROMOTION 1). 
Interestingly, about half of the elderly are concentrated in just eight states: California, 
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younger individuals to suffer from chronic disease and disability.7 
When these elderly do die, they most often do so in an institutional 
setting-a hospital or nursing home-where complex and often 
highly invasive medical technology may be employed in an effort to 
stave off death as long as possible.8 
For these individuals, the spectre is raised of a life in limbo. The 
phenomenal accomplishments of modern medical technology have 
made it possible for previously active adults to be incapable of any 
cognitive, sentient interaction with their environment or other 
human beings, but to have their biological and corporeal lives sus- 
tained indefinitely.9 At the same time, there are increasingly large 
numbers of people who are incurably ill, but whose death, as de- 
fined by current medical and legal criteria,lO is not imminent." 
Reflecting on this possibility of a "high-tech" death, many people 
are afraid that when the moment of their own death nears, they will 
Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. John Beck, supra, 
at 2. 
7. John Beck, supra note 6, at 1. As long ago as 1968, one study of chronic diseases 
found that "half of the deaths were from conditions diagnosed at least twenty-nine 
months earlier." Childress, ReJ&.sal ofLifesauing Treatment by Adults, 23 J. FAM. L. 191, 194 
(1984-85) (citing R. DUFF & A. HOLLINGSHEAD, SICKNESS AND SOCIETY 307 (1968)). 
More and more, the question is being raised of whether the "life" that ought to be 
protected at all costs includes mere biological and corporeal existence, or whether we 
can distinguish what is particularly human, and therefore sacred, from simple physical 
existence. See, e.6, Engelhardt, Medicine and the Concept of Person, in CONTEMPORARY IS- 
SUES IN BIOETHICS 94, 94-99 (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters 2d ed. 1982) (arguing that 
"human life has more than one meaning and that there is more than one sense of human 
person," and that important medical consequences flow from this recognition), reprinted 
in part in LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 1067-72. 
8. More than 80% of Americans over age 65 die in an institutional setting. In 
recent years, the percentage of those dying in hospitals has decreased, from 65 to 61% 
over the period from 1981 to 1985, while those dying in nursing homes has increased, 
from 19 to 21.5% during the same period. Boston Globe, Feb. 16, 1989, at 87, col. 1; see 
also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE & BIOMEDI- 
CAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 17-18
(1983) [hereinafter COMM'N REPORT]; M. PERLIN, supra note 6, 3 1803 (citing Kovar, Eld- 
erly People: The Population 65 Years and Over, in U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND 
WELFARE, HEALTH: UNITED STATES 1976-1977 at 3 (1977)). 
9. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 584 (D.R.I. 1988). The longest reported pe- 
riod of a patient being maintained in a comatose state is 37 years. COMM'N REPORT, 
supra note 8, at 177 n.16. 
10. A number of stares have adopted the 1968 "Harvard criteria" for death, which 
identify brain death, as determined by several factors, as the crucial test of non-life ver- 
sus life. LAW, SCIENCE & MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 1064-65; Black, Definitions of Brain 
Death, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING 5 , 6  ('r. Beauchamp & S. Perlin eds. 1978). 
By 1986, more than 40 states had adopted some group of neurological criteria for death, 
either by statute orjudicial decision. J. AREEN. P. KING, S. GOLDBERG &A. CAPRON, LAW, 
SCIENCE & MEDICINE 208 (Supp. 1987). 
11. At any one time, as many as 10,000 Americans are in the long-term unconscious 
condition known as a persistent vegetative state. See infra note 18; see also Brophy v. New 
England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417,421-27 & nn. 4 & 6,497 N.E.2d 626, 628-31 & nn. 
4 & 6 (1986) (discussing at length the definition and physical consequences of being in a 
persistent vegetative state). 
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be unable to make choices concerning it. As Seneca declared nearly 
two thousand years ago, "Just as I choose a ship to sail in or a house 
to live in, so I choose a death for my passage from life. . . . Nowhere 
should we indulge the soul more than in dying."I2 
Ironically, in the past twenty-five years there have been a number 
of judicial decisions announcing both a constitutiona113 and com- 
mon law right to privacy,l4 including the right, under certain cir- 
cumstances, to refuse all life-sustaining15 medical treatment.16 
12. Seneca, Suicide, in THE STOIC PHILOSOPHY OF SENECA 202, 204 (M. Hadas trans. 
1968). 
13. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 484-86 (1964). 
14. A right to privacy, inherent in the right to be free from invasion of one's bodily 
integrity, has long been recognized at common law, both as a right exproprio vigore and as 
an aspect of the right to be free from the tort of battery, an unconsented touching. See, 
e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-39, 
370 N.E.2d 417,424 (1977) ("There is implicit recognition in the law . . . that a person 
has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity."); 
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 21 1 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,93 (1914) (Car- 
dozo, J.) (recognizing a competent adult's right to determine what will be done to his 
body, and that medical treatment without the patient's consent is a battery). 
15. Life-sustaining medical treatment is used here to mean any medical treatment 
that substitutes for a normal bodily function in a way that sustains life. It includes not 
only such obvious examples as respirators, kidney dialysis machines, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, and organ transplantation, but also treatment with antibiotics and the pro- 
vision of food and hydration by such means as intravenous feeding or a nasogastric tube. 
Whether artificial means of supplying food and water should be defined as medical 
treatment that can be withheld or withdrawn under the same circumstances as any other 
medical treatment is the subject of intense controversy at present. In 1986 the Ameri- 
can Medical Association (AMA) adopted a revised ethical opinion indicating that the 
artificial provision of nutrition and hydration should be viewed as medically and ethically 
comparable to other forms of medical treatment. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL 
AFFAIRS, AMA, CURRENT OPINIONS 5 2.18 (1986) [hereinafter AMA COUNCIL]. The un- 
derlying view here is that, " '[flood and water should always be provided when they are 
needed for patient comfort, but when . . . all it does is lengthen the terminal period 
without adding comfort, . . . it may be more beneficial to withhold nutrition and hydra- 
tion.' " Childress, supra note 7, at 212 (quoting Dr. Virginia Keeney). However, a vocal 
minority of critics of this position, led by Dr. Mark Siegler and Attorney Alan J. 
Weisbard, contends that artificial methods of providing food and water are sui generis, 
and should not be withheld or withdrawn as a matter of general medical practice, both 
because of their emotional significance as symbols of compassion and caring and be- 
cause of a concern that permitting the withholding of food and water from the incurably 
ill is but the first step down the slippery slope of withholding nourishment from "the 
severely senile, the pleasantly senile, the retarded, . . . and perhaps, the aged." Siegler 
& Weisbard, Againsf the Emerging Stream: Should Fluids and Nutritional Support Be Discontin- 
ued?, 145 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 129, 130-31 (1985). 
16. The right to refuse medical treatment has been recognized during the past 30 
years as an important aspect of a patient's right to participate in the medical decision- 
making process, frequently denominated the right to give informed consent to medical 
treatment. E.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 1064 (1972); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,406-07,350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). 
More recently, the right to refuse medical treatment has been asserted by involuntarily 
committed mental patients, who have sought, with some success, to refuse treatment 
with antipsychotic drugs. See Rennie v. Kiein, 653 F.2d 836, 844 (3d Cir. 1981) (en 
banc), vacafed and remanded, 458 U.S. 11 19 (1982), reaff 'd on olher grounds, 720 F.2d 266 
(3d Cir. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497-98, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343-44, 504 
N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986); Rogers v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Health, 390 
Mass. 489, 497, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 (1983). 
A specific right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment has been recognized by an 
increasing number of state courts as an important aspect of the constitutional and com- 
mon law rights to privacy. The landmark case of In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,355 A.2d 647, 
cut. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), was one of the first in the nation to address this 
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However, the combination of advanced medical technology, increas- 
ing judicial involvement in the protection of individual liberties, and 
the rising tide of medical malpractice litigation1' has led to a situa- 
tion in which the goal of private, personal decisionmaking about the 
manner and timing of one's death often exists more as a matter of 
abstract legal principle than as a practical reality. 
The time has come for a reexamination of traditional approaches 
to thinking about death, and, in particular, the process by which we 
reach decisions about terminating medical treatment. The thesis of 
this Article is that there are two major aspects of human personhood 
that must be central to our thinking in this area. The first is that of 
individual autonomy and privacy: the fundamental principle that 
each person should be the architect of her own destiny, both be- 
cause this is an inalienable human right and because, as a practical 
matter, she is in the best position to know her own needs and 
desires. Thus, substitute decisionmaking for an incompetent adult 
should seek to respect and promote that individual's right to auton- 
omy and privacy, both by seeking to effectuate his medical treatment 
choice, to the extent that it can be determined once he is no longer 
competent, and by providing a sphere for private decisionmaking by 
that individual, his family, and his physician, into which the state 
cannot intrude. 
The second fundamental aspect of human personhood, which has 
been virtually ignored by courts and commentators, is that each in- 
dividual is a member of a community: we are human precisely be- 
cause we can interact, communicate with, and care for other people. 
Thus, we are individuals in a web of relationships and connections- 
between spouses, between parents and children, within a family, and 
within a community. 
Regrettably, most recent writing about decisionmaking for the in- 
competent, incurably ill patient has focused solely on the patient's 
right to autonomy, and indeed, on one particular aspect of that au- 
tonomy-the ability to refuse treatment. Because this writing 
troubling area. More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court has sought to answer 
some of the questions left open in Q i n l a n  in: In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 
(1987), In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394,529 A.2d 434 (1987), In re Pel&, 108 N.J. 365,529 A.2d 
419 (1987), and In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985). The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has also recognized a constitutional and common law right to 
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 
373 Mass. 728,370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). Numerous other state courts have reached simi- 
lar conclusions. E.g, Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 130, 
482 A.2d 713,717-18 (Super. Ct. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120-21,660 P.2d 
738, 742 (1983); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980); Leach v. Akron 
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 814 (C.P. 1980). 
17. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 1-3, 
7-8, 36-38 (1982). 
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neglects the need to preserve and promote the relational aspects, of 
human personhood, it is seriously incomplete. 
This Article is thus an exploration of the essentials of the human 
personhood in community, both the intimate community of family and 
close friends and the larger, more impersonal community of hospi- 
tals and health care providers, courts, legislatures, and lawyers. Af- 
ter undertaking an analysis of the sources of the autonomy model 
for decisionmaking in this area and the negative consequences of an 
exclusive reliance on that model, this Article will propose a new 
moral, legal, and medical framework for making medical treatment 
decisions for incompetent incurably ill adults. This model both pro- 
vides maximum opportunities for each individual to determine for 
himself, without state interference, whether, and under what cir- 
cumstances, he should receive life-sustaining medical treatment. Si- 
multaneously, it recognizes that because all individuals are persons 
in community, decisionmaking in this area must promote and re- 
spect the connectedness of the human family by providing incen- 
tives and opportunity for conversation and compassion. 
I. The Problem: The Incompetent, Incurably Ill Patient and the 
Risk of Erroneous Decisionmaking 
To understand fully the problem of decisionmaking for incurably 
ill, incompetent adults we must examine first who they are, and sec- 
ond, the issues that make decisions in this area so problematic. 
Perhaps the most famous example of a person suffering a pro- 
longed dying is Karen Ann Quinlan, the young woman who, for rea- 
sons unknown, suffered brain damage and lost consciousness, 
remaining in a persistent vegetative stateIs for almost ten years 
before she died.19 In the seminal case of In Te Quinlan,*O Quinlan's 
father persuaded the New Jersey Supreme Court to appoint him as 
his daughter's guardian in order to act as a surrogate and exercise 
her constitutional right to privacy. The court held that this right 
encompassed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment 
under the particular circumstances of this case. 
More recently, much attention has been given to the case of Paul 
Brophy, a Massachusetts fire fighter who suffered a cerebral aneu- 
rysm and lost cons~iousness .~~ As a result of his stroke, Brophy en- 
tered a persistent vegetative state, unable to swallow and thus to 
ingest food. To  keep him alive, Brophy's doctors surgically im- 
planted a gastrostomy tube that provided him with nutrition and 
18. Persistent vegetative state is the neurological condition that occurs post-coma, 
in which the autonomic nervous system continues to function after the cognitive func- 
tioning of the mind has ceased. Altman, Il'hen the ~Lfind Dies Buf [he Brain Lives On, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 17, 1987, at C3, col. 5. In 1986, there were estimated to be 10,000 patients 
in a persistent vegetative state. Wallis, To Feed or Not to Feed?, TIME, March 31, 1986, at 
60. . .  
19. Karen Ann Quinlan lived for five years after her father was permitted to exercise 
her right to refuse treatment. 
20. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cut. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
21. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). 
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hydration.22 Ultimately, Brophy's wife persuaded the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court to act as a substitute decisionmaker on 
Brophy's behalf. The court determined that Brophy would have 
elected not to receive medical treatment under these circumstances, 
and accordingly, authorized the removal of the gastrostomy tube.23 
Less well-known than Quinlan and Brophy, but much more nu- 
merous, are those people, frequently elderly, suffering from incur- 
able cancer, emphysema, strokes, and countless other degenerative 
diseases who eventually are so debilitated by illness, advancing se- 
nility, or necessary pain medication that they become incapable of 
.communicating with others about their treatment desires.Z4 Be- 
cause any number of medical complications can be life-threatening 
for these individuals, the question is frequently raised as to whether 
continued aggressive medical treatment is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  
Each of these cases raises profound medical, moral, and legal is- 
sues. Because the individual is incompetent, incapable of presently 
making a decision to accept or reject medical treatment, someone 
must make a decision on her behalf. But who should that deci- 
sionmaker be, and what approach should she employ in making the 
decision? 
Historically, and to a large extent still today, decisions to treat or 
not treat the incurably ill, incompetent patient were made by the 
patient's physicians, or her family, or the two in ~ombinat ion .~~ But,
often today, doctors and families are seeking the assistance of the 
courts to act either as the decisionmaker in the first instance, or as 
the arbiter of last resort. Many physicians are refusing to discon- 
tinue life-sustaining medical treatment without judicial authoriza- 
tion, due either to their own sense of professional ethics or to the 
fear of civil or criminal liabilit~.~' 
At the heart of the ethical conundrum raised by these cases is the 
22. Id. at 421, 497 N.E.2d at 628. 
23. Id. at 441-42, 497 N.E.2d at 639-40. 
24. See Munetz, Lidz & Meisel, Infonned Consent and Incompetent Medical Patients, 20 J .  
FAM. PRACTICE 273,275-77 (1985); Hilfiker, Allowing the Debilitated to Die, 308 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 716, 717 (1983). 
25. See, e.g., Hilfiker, supra note 24, at 717 (suggesting that doctors frequently make a 
subconscious decision not to provide "maximal possible care" to incompetent, termi- 
nally ill patients). 
26. See In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 552, 531 N.E.2d 
607, 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 
321, 345,486 A.2d 1209, 1227 (1985). 
27. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417,497 N.E.2d 626 (1986); 
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); cf: Barber v. 
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). Barber is apparently 
the only reported American murder prosecution based on a physician's withdrawal of 
life support systems. The Barber case was brought against physicians who, at the direc- 
tion of a patient's family, disconnected all his life-support systems after he had suffered a 
post-surgery cardio-respiratory arrest that led to severe and permanent brain damage. 
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collective judgment of our society that human life and human per- 
sonhood are sacred and must be zealously protected. When this be- 
lief is combined with the obvious reality that a decision to withhold 
life-sustaining treatment is irrevocable, it leads to a fear of error in 
deci~ionmaking*~ that may become paraly~ing.~" The awareness of 
this risk of error, and the possibility of abuse in a substituted judg- 
ment process, currently pervades much of the judicial and other 
writing in this area.30 
Although the circumstances of each individual patient are of 
course unique, there are three major factors that contribute to the 
risk of an improper decision being made. These are, first, the risk of 
an erroneous medical diagnosis of the patient's condition; second, 
the risk of an erroneous medical assessment of the patient's progno- 
sis, even with a correctly diagnosed condition; and third, the risk 
that a substitute decisionmaker might erroneously assess the pa- 
tient's treatment wishes. 
There is limited data available about the frequency of medical 
misdiagnosis or prognosis,31 but most readers will be aware of some 
evidence that suggests that this is at least a minimal risk.32 A 
number of courts have implicitly recognized the possibility of 
28. Whether it is a more egregious error to choose death for an incompetent person 
who would have opted for even a limited life, or to choose life for a person who would 
have preferred immediate death to a long and painful struggle is, of course, a question 
that can only be answered by resort to one's personal values and beliefs. 
29. A distinguished group of American physicians has commented: 
Fear of legal liability often interferes with the physician's ability to make the 
best choice for the patient. Assessment of legal risks is sometimes made by 
lawyers whose primary objective is to minimize liability, whether real or 
imagined. Unfortunately, this may be done at the expense of humane treat- 
ment and may go against the expressed wishes of the patient o r  family. 
Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig, & van 
Eys, The Physician S Responsibility toward Hopelessl~ Ill Patients, 3 10 NEW ENG. J. MED. 955, 
956 (1984) [hereinafter Physician? Responsibility]. Of course, the fear of legal liability 
should not be invoked as an excuse for avoiding the hard choices that both adulthood 
and professional responsibility place upon all of us. 
30. For example, Justice Lynch's dissenting opinion in Brophy v. New England Sinai 
Hospital states: "A substituted judgment standard is our best legal tool to divine individ- 
ual intent and to protect autonomous choice. But it would be an error of great magni- 
tude to conflate a substituted judgment with an actual judgment." 398 Mass. at 448,497 
N.E.2d at 643. 
3 1. Physician 5 Responsibility, supra note 29, at 956. 
32. As President Derek Bok noted in his 1983 report on medical education to the 
Harvard Board of Overseers: 
[Mlany studies have revealed that doctors make a disturbing number of ma- 
jor diagnostic errors. For example, a recent survey of 100 autopsies at a 
prominent teaching hospital disclosed such mistakes in 22 percent of the 
cases. In almost half of these instances, a correct diagnosis would have indi- 
cated a change in the treatment that might have prolonged life. 
Bok, XEEDED: A new way to train doctors, HARV. MAG. 32, 39 (May-June 1984) (copy on 
file at the George ltrmhington Law Rmiew) (citing Goldman, Sayson, Robbins, Cohn, 
Bettman 8: Weinberg, The l'alue of the Autopsy in Three ilfedical Eras, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1000 (1983)). Bok also noted that many internists frequently neglected routine "high 
yield" diagnostic tests: 
[A] survey of 249 patients in the outpatient clinic of a teaching hospital re- 
vealed that internists often neglected simple high-yield procedures such as 
examining the prostate or asking for a urinalysis (omitted 20 percent of the 
time), ordering blood-sugar analysis (omitted 30 percent of the time), and 
testing the stool for blood (omitted 40 percent of the time). 
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mistaken diagnosis or prognosis, either by requiring the patient's 
condition to be concurred in by additional physicians,33 by calling 
for an "ethics committee" to evaluate the likely prognosis of a pa- 
tient in a persistent vegetative state,34 or by requiring that evidence 
of the patient's hopeless prognosis and diagnosis be "clear and con- 
vincing," the highest civil standard of proof.35 Many "natural death 
acts" recognize this risk by requiring two or more physicians to cer- 
tify that a patient suffers from a "terminal condition" before the pa- 
tient's attending physician can discontinue life-sustaining 
treatment.36 
In addition, although physicians may agree on a general progno- 
sis for a particular patient, predicting the precise moment of an im- 
pending death is extremely difficult.37 Thus, in cases in which a 
prognosis that a patient has only a few months to live may lead to a 
call for less aggressive treatment than would be afforded a patient 
who had a year or more to live, the risk that a prognosis of a very 
short life expectancy will become a self-fulfilling prophecy is 
apparent .38 
Yet perhaps the most significant concern about erroneous deci- 
sionmaking stems from the inherent inability of a substitute deci- 
sionmaker to know with certainty the incompetent patient's own 
wishes.39 Here, the most common scenarios are that: (1) the deci- 
sionmaker has no information about the patient's values and priori- 
Id. (citing Goetzl, Cohen, Downing, Erat & Jessiman, Quality ofDiagnostic Examinations in a 
University Hospital Outpatient Clinic, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 481 (1983)). 
33. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,384,486 A.2d 1209, 1242 (1985); In re Bany, 445 So. 
2d 365,372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 137,660 P.2d 738, 
751 (1983); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132,482 A.2d 
713, 721 (Super. Ct. 1984). 
34. Caber, 99 Wash. 2d at 134-35,660 P.2d at 749; In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10,54,355 
A.2d 647. 671. cerl. denied. 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
35. I; re ~dbes ,  108 N.J. 394,407-08,'529 k.2d 434,441 (1987); see Leach v. Akron 
Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 11, 426 N.E.2d 809, 815 (C.P. 1980). 
36. See, e .g ,  IOWA CODE ANN. $ 144A.5 (1987) (requiring another physician to con- 
firm the attending physician's determination of a "terminal condition"). 
37. CO~IM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 25. Indeed, "[elxcept in patients who were 
very ill and had short prognosis [sic] of three to four months, survival was consistently 
underestimated." Aiken & Man, Hospica: Peupectiva on the Public Policy Debate, 37 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1271, 1275 (1982), quoted in COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 11-44. 
38. Pearlman, Inui & Carter, Variability in Physician Bioethical Decision-making: A Case 
Study ofEuthanasia, 97 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 420 (1982), cited in COMM'N REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 25 n.44. 
39. Even in the case of a competent patient, it is often difficult to know whether the 
person is making a carefully thought-out and voluntary decision to reject all or certain 
types of medical treatment, or is acting, at least in part, on the basis of depression or a 
belief that others wish the patient to choose death. R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRAN- 
GERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 6-7 (1979); Beschle, Autono~nous 
Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining the "Right to Die'', 77 KY. L.J. 319, 354-58 
(1988-89). 
The importance of exploring a patient's apparent wishes in some detail, and through 
the process of conversation, is emphasized in Jackson & Youngner, Patient Autonomy and 
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ties in the matter of life-sustaining treatment, because the patient 
has never expressed any opinion on the question of refusing such 
t~-eatment;~O (2) the decisionmaker has some information about the 
patient's desires, but is not sure how to apply that information to 
the actual medical situation confronting the patient;41 and (3) 
whatever the information the substitute decisionmaker does have 
about the patients wishes is viewed, consciously or not, through the 
lens of the decisionmaker's own self-interest, biases, and values.. In- 
deed, such potential for distortion of the patient's wishes, even if 
they could be fully known, is inevitable, given the reality that it is 
not the decisionmaker's own imminent death that she is called upon 
to choose.42 
Thus, whenever the family of an incompetent person asserts a 
right to make the decision for him, the possibility exists that the 
family's claim that the patient had previously declared a wish "to die 
with dignity7' is merely masking the family's wish to see the patient 
dead, either because of dislike, or avarice, or to end the drain on the 
family's dwindling financial and emotional resources.43 Indeed, 
when the patient is incompetent, then it is at least arguable that it is 
the family's, rather than the patient's, privacy interest that is at 
stake, because the patient is neither aware of the offensive intrusion 
into her body nor the notoriety that her case may be evoking.44 
Conversely, a family, or one of its members, who asserts that the 
"Death With Dignity," 301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 404,407 (1979), r@.nfed in LAW, SCIENCE &
MEDICINE, supra note 4, at 1127, 1132. Jackson and Youngner write: 
Physicians . . . must be alert not to let the possibility of abuse keep them 
from the appropriate exercise of professional judgment. Physicians who are 
uncomfortable or inexperienced in dealing with the complex psychosocial 
issues facing critically ill patients may ignore an important aspect of their 
professional responsibility by taking a patient's or family's statement at face 
value without further exploration or clarification. 
Id. For further discussion of the need for conversation in decisionmaking for the incom- 
petent incurably ill, see Section 111, infra. 
40. E.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,380,420 N.E.2d 64, 72,438 N.Y.S.2d 266,275, 
cot.  denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). 
41. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 428, 497 N.E.2d 626, 
632 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N J. 321, 340, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (1985) (involving a 
senile and confused nursing home patient sustained by a nasogastric feeding tube, 
whose nephew declared, "[alll [Ms. Conroy and her sisters] wanted was to .  . . have their 
bills paid and die in their own house." (alterations by the court)). 
42. In his recent article, Donald Beschle writes powerfully about our inherent inabil- 
ity either to accurately predict how we will feel when our own death is imminent or to 
meaningfully stand in the position of another and assess the choice that person would 
make when faced with the reality of incurable illness. Beschle, supra note 39, at 341-46. 
43. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 130, 660 P.2d 738, 747 (1983). 
44. M. Hayes, Remarks during the Law, Science, and Medicine Seminar, Suffolk 
University Law School (Spring 1988). Others, however, have argued that an important 
aspect of the right to privacy is the present peace of mind that one feels when assured 
that one's wishes will be carried out even if one is not in a position to be aware of it, just 
as one feels more secure after having signed a will that one's minor children will be 
cared for and one's property will be disbursed in accordance with that document. 
Cantor, Conroy, Best Interests, and the Handling ofDying Patients, 37 RUTGER~ L. REV. 543, 
556 (1985). Further, "[slome languishing patients, though not sufficiently aware to 
make a competent medical decision, may have enough awareness to sense and appreci- 
ate relief when painful, intrusive, or embarrassing care is withdrawn in accordance with 
his or her prior instructions." Id. 
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patient wanted all possible treatment provided, might be reflecting 
the decisionmaker's own fear of dying, or a religious view that life 
must be prolonged at all cost, or even a perverse satisfaction in see- 
ing the patient suffer. 
Similarly, in the case of the physician decisionmaker, the physi- 
cian's aggressive treatment may reflect his own fear of death and 
dying, his concern with demonstrating professional competence,45 
or his desire to generate a large fee. Or, in exactly the same situa- 
tion, with the same patient statements, a different physician might 
argue against treatment, because the physician views her role as one 
of easing suffering and comforting the dying when sustaining life is 
no longer possible,46 or because she needs an intensive care unit 
bed for a patient with a more hopeful prognosis. 
These same risks of unconscious value bias apply to the judicial 
decisionmaker as well. For the judge, every bit as much as the phy- 
sician or family member, there is the possibility that his retrospec- 
tive assessment of the incompetent patient's wishes will be colored 
by his own fears of an existence in limbo, a life that he might not 
deem worth living. Thus, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court seemed to validate Quinlan's father's exercise of her right to 
refuse medical treatment in part because "the overwhelming major- 
ity [of society] would, we think, in similar circumstances, exercise 
such a choice in the same way for themselves or for those closest to 
them."47 Although both the New Jersey Supreme Court and other 
courts have subsequently eschewed any suggestion that they were 
making decisions based on the "quality" of the patient's life28 it is 
naive to suppose that any decision of this nature can be totally di- 
vorced from the values of the decisionmaker. 
Indeed, over the past twelve years, many courts have easily dis- 
missed what would seem to be an enormous state interest in the 
preservation of life.49 Remarkably, they have often concluded, even 
- 
45. Physician's Responsibility, supra note 29, at 956; see Jaretzki, Death with Dignit)- 
Passive Euthanasia, 76 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 539. 541 (1976). 
46. In its most recent pronouncement on this aspect of medical ethics, The Ameri- 
can Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs declared in pertinent 
part: 
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve suffer- 
ing. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other, the choice 
of the patient, or his Family or legal representative if the patient is incompe- 
tent to act in his own behalf, should prevail. In the absence of the patient's 
choice or an authorized proxy, the physician must act in the best interest of 
the patient. 
AMA COUNCIL, supra note 15, at § 2.18 (Withholding or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging 
Medical Treatment). 
47. 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976). 
48. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635 
(1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 335, 486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985). 
49. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433-34, 497 N.E.2d at 635; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 
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in the absence of significant evidence of what an incompetent indi- 
vidual would have chosen, that his privacy interest in terminating 
medical treatment is param0unt.5~ Many courts forthrightly ac- 
knowledge the difficult moral and ethical terrain they are traversing 
and the agonizing nature of the decisions that they have been called 
upon to make.51 Nonetheless, some critics charge that this apparent 
solicitude for individual liberty masks impermissible judicial choices 
based upon the quality of a patient's life,52 and that such decisions 
launch us onto an ethical slippery slope that will soon lead to the 
active killing of a large number of socially undesirable individuals.53 
Judicial activism on behalf of the incompetent has been severely crit- 
icized as "paternalism masquerading as the mere ratification of au- 
tonomous choice."54 
The danger, of course, no matter who the de~isionmaker,5~ is that 
what purports to be a concern for death with dignity is translated in 
fact into a lack of concern for the person who is dying. Respect for 
individual autonomy can translate quickly into abandonment, 
whether intended or n0t,~6 as has often been the case with the 
A.2d at 1226; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1981); Satz v. 
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), af'd,  379 So.2d 359 
(Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 
741-42, 370 N.E.2d 417,425-26 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,40-41, 355 A.2d 647, 
663-64, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
50. See infra notes 146-214, and accompanying text. At the same time, however, 
some courts have refused to follow this trend, rigorously applying the requirement of 
"clear and convincing" evidence to err on the side of preserving life. E.6, In re West- 
chester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531,531 N.E.2d 607,613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 
886, 893-94 (1988); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 
266, 274, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). For insightful discussions of the inherent 
difficulty in meeting the standard of "clear and convincing" evidence, see the concurring 
and dissenting opinions in Westchter County Medical Center, and Rhoden, Litigating Life 
and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 377, 390-91 (1988). 
51. See, e.g., In re Jobes, 108 NJ. 394, 446, 529 A.2d 434, 461 (1987); Brophy, 398 
Mass. at 419,497 N.E.2d at 627; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 334, 486 A.2d at 1220. 
52. Beschle, supra note 39. at 348-50. 
53. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987). 
54. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 448, 497 N.E.2d at 643 (Lynch, J., dissenting in part). 
55. These risks of erroneous diagnosis, prognosis, and treatment choice exist 
equally in the "substituted judgment" model and the theoretically more objective "best 
interests of the patient" approach. Under both models, the decisionmaker's own biases, 
and the lack of access to complete information, combine to make the ultimate decision 
fraught with uncertainty. Under the "substituted judgment" approach, the deci- 
sionmaker attempts to put herself in the patient's position and make the choice that the 
patient would make if he could temporarily become capable of choosing a course of 
treatment, considering his incompetence as one of the factors bearing on that decision. 
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 752-53, 370 
N.E.2d 417,430 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10,39,355 A.2d 647,663, cerl. denied, 429 
U.S. 922 (1976). Under a "best interests" approach, the decisionmaker attempts to de- 
termine what course of treatment would be superior, using ostensibly objective criteria 
to evaluate the impact of disparate treatments. 
Yet in the case of incompetent patients, the distinction between these two standards 
must, of necessity, blur, because any assessment of what an incompetent person would 
choose if he were competent will inevitably include data based upon the choices of a 
reasonable person in the incompetent's present condition. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39-40, 
355 A.2d at 663-64. 
For an illuminating exploration of the deficiencies of both the "substituted judgment" 
and "best interests" approaches, see Rhoden, supra note 50, at 380-419. 
56. Competent patients who have chosen to be allowed to die may experience a 
Heinonline - -  57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 812 1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  [VOL. 57:801 
Priuacy and Personhood 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
deinstitutionalization of the civilly committed mentally i11.57 
This danger is a particular concern with nursing home patients, 
who are often socially and medically isolated, and can be subject to 
abuse by underpaid caretakers in an impoverished and often dan- 
gerous environment. Such patients usually suffer from a comple- 
ment of chronic, progressively degenerative diseases, frequently 
accompanied by limited cognitive f~nct ioning.~~ This cognitive im- 
pairment, coupled with the traditional tendency of the elderly to be 
deferential to medical authority, often prevents nursing home resi- 
dents from asserting their needs. 
II. The Classic A@roach: Autonomy as the Paramount Value 
A. Sources of the Autonomy Model 
Over the past dozen years, courts and legislatures have responded 
to the agonizing problems posed by substitute decisionmaking for 
the incurably ill by exalting individual autonomy as the primary 
value to be achieved. This exclusive focus on self-determination, 
however, has often led to the denigration of the very personhood 
that its advocates claim to be protecting by involving the machinery 
of the state in what ought to be a very private, family-centered 
affair.59 
Yet this reliance on an autonomy model is hardly surprising, be- 
cause the right of the individual to be let alone, free from govern- 
ment interference, has long been a deeply cherished American 
value.60 Its priority as a societal guiding principle is reflected by its 
resultant feeling of abandonment after they have made this decision, as physicians and 
nurses are no longer displaying maximal, "heroic" efforts to sustain life. "The family 
may share this feeling on behalf of the dying patient and have difficulty grappling with 
the consequences of a decision in which they may or may not have played a part." Physi- 
cian's Responsibility, supra note 29, at 957. Abandonment is particularly likely to be the 
case of the elderly in nursing homes. This concern is discussed at length by the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375-77, 486 A.2d at 1237-38. 
57. See Lamb, Deinsfitutionalization and the Homehs Mentally Ill, in THE HOMELESS 
MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 55, 
62, 66 (H. Lamb ed. 1984). 
58. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 375-77,486 A.2d at 1237-38; Hilfiker, supra note 24, at 716. 
59. It is of course true, as Martha Minow has noted with insight, that labelling the 
issue as one of state intervention versus personal privacy can obfuscate, rather than illu- 
minate, the fundamental tensions involved. State intervention can take a variety of 
forms, from active judicial involvement to comprehensive legislation or regulation. The 
debate on the appropriateness of a particular action should be addressed on its merits, 
rather than through the invocation of political rhetoric. Minow, Bqond State Infewention 
in the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U .  MICH. J.L. REFORM 933, 934-37, 946-53 (1985). 
60. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
In one of his most eloquent dissents, Brandeis declared that: 
[in adopting the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, t]he makers of our Constitu- 
tion undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. 
They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings 
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and 
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prominence in both state and federal constitutions, as well as the 
common law. The roots of this libertarian concern may be found in 
the writings of the seventeenth century political philosophers who 
so heavily influenced the founders of our republic. Thomas Hobbes 
and John Locke envisioned government as both necessary, in order 
to avoid the hardships of life in a state of nature, which was fre- 
quently "nasty, brutish, and short,"61 and ~ o n s e n s u a l , ~ ~  existing by 
virtue of the joint agreement of the citizenry to cede just so much of 
their freedom and autonomy as was necessary to ensure a peaceful, 
and therefore more productive, society.G3 Drawing upon this vision 
of a limited government, and writing against the backdrop of what 
were perceived to be a despotic king and a heavy-handed parlia- 
ment, the Framers of the Constitution created a federal government 
of limited and enumerated powers, leaving to the states and "the 
people" all powers not specifically granted to the federal 
g~vernment.~" 
For many years courts did not address the precise scope of this 
residual liberty interest, although the principle that it encompassed 
freedom to contract received judicial support in the heyday of sub- 
stantive due process,65 and a more intimate, family-centered right to 
freedom in personal decisionmaking was recognized in Meyer v. 
Nebraska66 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.67 However, in the last quar- 
ter century a major judicial revolution has occurred, during which 
the principle has been enshrined as absolute that the individual citi- 
zen retains a fundamental interest in liberty and privacy that cannot 
be intruded upon by the government, whether federal or state, ab- 
sent a compelling countervailing interest. 
In the landmark case of Griswold u. Connectic~t,~~ the Supreme 
Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that made it 
criminal to use or prescribe any contraceptive device.69 In so 
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to pro- 
tect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen- 
sations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let 
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi- 
lized men. 
Id., quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., 
concurring). 
61. T. Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 100, 129 (1651) (Collier (MacMillan) ed. 1962). 
62. Id. at 129; J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, 3 95 (Dent & Sons 
ed.' 1924) (1st ed. 1690). 
63. J. LOCKE, supra note 62, $8 99, 123, 131. 
64. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re- 
tained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides that: 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. 
amend. X. For further discussion of this retained liberty interest of the individual and 
role of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in protecting it, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 486-96 (1965). 
65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
66. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
67. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
69. Id. at 480. 
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holding, the Court relied upon the fundamental constitutional right 
to privacy, which it found existed in the marital relationship. Citing 
the Ninth Amendment, the Court found that certain fundamental 
rights are protected by the Constitution even though not specifically 
enumerated in the Bill of Rights or subsequent constitutional 
amendments.70 Included among these rights is the right to pri- 
vacy-the right to a sphere of personal thought and action free from 
government invasion-which the Court found to be implicit in the 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth  amendment^.^^ 
Following Griswold, the Supreme Court announced a series of de- 
cisions that upheld the right of the individual to be let alone, free 
from state intrusion, absent a compelling state interest. These in- 
cluded Stanley v. Georgia, 72 which recognized a right to exercise First 
Amendment rights in the privacy of one's own home, even if the 
material that one was viewing might be deemed pornographi~,~3 
and Roe v. Wade, 74 which found that the fundamental right to privacy 
encompassed the right of a woman to decide to terminate her preg- 
nancy, free from state interference, during the first trimester of 
pregnan~y.~5 
Following Griswold, Stanley, and Roe, a number of state and lower 
federal courts found this fundamental constitutional right to privacy 
to encompass the right to refuse medical treatment, drawing upon 
both the federal and state constitutional rights to privacy and the 
tort law doctrines of battery and informed consent. Aside from 
cases in which the patient seeks to refuse life-sustaining medical 
treatment, this issue has arisen most often in the case of involunta- 
rily committed mental patients, who have sought to refuse unwanted 
treatment with psychotropic medication. Generally, such a right to 
refuse such medication has been recognized in all except narrowly 
defined emergency situati0ns.~6 
70. Id. at 482-85, 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 499-502 (Harlan, J., concur- 
ring). Eschewing the notion that it might be calling for a revitalization of the doctrine of 
substantive due process, the Court declared: 
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and 
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social 
conditions. This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of 
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation. 
Id. at 482. 
71. Id at 482-85. 
72. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
73. Id. at 565-68. 
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
75. Id. at 153-54, 164. In enunciating this right of privacy, the Court found it un- 
necessary to determine whether its source was the personal liberty interest protected 
from state intrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment or the "Ninth Amendment's reser- 
vation of rights to the'people." Id. at 153. 
76. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacafed and remanded, 458 
U.S. 11 19 (1982), reaff'd on ofhergroun&, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rivers v. Katz, 67 
N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Rogers v. Commissioner of the 
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Like the cases invoking the federal constitutional right to privacy, 
these decisions have emphasized the centrality of individual auton- 
omy and self-determination to their analysis. For example, in Rivers 
v. K a t ~ , ~ ~  the New York Court of Appeals relied upon the common 
law action for battery for unauthorized medical treatment and the 
state constitutional guarantees of liberty and due process to hold 
that civilly committed mental patients have a right to refuse un- 
wanted treatment. The court declared: 
[Tlhe right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment must 
be honored, even though the recommended Treatment may be 
beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life. . . . 
In our system of a free government, where notions of individual 
autonomy and free choice are cherished, it is the individual who 
must have the final say in respect to decisions regarding his medi- 
cal treatment in order to insure that the greatest possible protec- 
tion is accorded his autonomy and freedom from unwanted 
interference with the furtherance of his own desires. This right 
extends equally to mentally ill persons who are not to be treated 
as persons of lesser status or dignity because of their il lne~s.~8 
This emphasis on individual self-determination and inviolability is 
seen more generally in the common law principle that one has a 
right to be free from battery-an unconsented touching. Its applica- 
tion to unauthorized medical treatment has had a long history. As 
early as Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hospital79 and Pratt v. 
Davis, courts have invoked the principle of individual autonomy in 
recognizing a cause of action in tort against physicians who per- 
formed surgical procedures against the patient's wishes.8' 
Today, this concern for patient autonomy receives judicial 
Dep't of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489, 504,458 N.E.2d 308, 318 (1983). Emergencies 
are generally defined as situations in which a failure to forcibly medicate the patient 
presents a substantial risk of serious harm to others or to the patient himself, including 
the risk of an "'immediate, substantial, and irreversible deterioration of a serious 
mental illness.' " Rogers, 390 Mass. at 510-1 1, 458 N.E.2d at 322 (quoting Guardianship 
of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 441, 421 N.E.2d 40, 55 (1981)). 
77. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986). 
78. Id. at 493,495 N.E.2d at 341. 504 N.Y.S.2d at 79 (citations omitted). The high- 
est courts of Massachusetts and New Jersey have employed similar reasoning. In Superin- 
tendent of Bekherlown School v. Saikewin, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), the court 
declared: 
There is implicit recognition in the law of the Commonwealth, as else- 
where, that a person has a strong interest in being free from nonconsensual 
invasion of his bodily integrity. . . . [Tlhe law recognizes the invidual inter- 
est in preserving "the inviolability of his person." . . . 
Of even broader import, but arising from the same regard for human dig- 
nity and self-determination, is the unwritten constitutional right of privacy 
found in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted); accord Brophy, 398 Mass. at 
430-31, 497 N.E.2d at 633-34; Conroy, 98 NJ. at 346-48, 486 A.2d at 1221-23. 
79. 21 1 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
80. 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906). 
81. In ringing language, Judge Cardozo declared that: "Every human being of adult 
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; 
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an 
assault, for which he is liable in damages." 21 1 N.Y. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93. Unfortu- 
nately for the plaintiff Schloendorff, her suit against the defendant hospital was barred 
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recognition under the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine 
requires that the physician, as part of her fiduciary duty of providing 
good medical care, inform her patient both as to what a particular 
proposed treatment and its alternatives (including non-treatment) 
entail, and the risks and benefits of each.S2 The central, tenet of the 
informed consent doctrine is that because of our respect for individ- 
ual autonomy and self-determination, each patient has the right to 
receive all the information necessary for him to make a knowledge- 
able decision concerning the most appropriate form of treatment.83 
The failure to provide such information may give rise to a cause of 
action for medical malpracti~e.~4 
In the case of incurably ill patients, virtually every state or lower 
federal court that has addressed the issue has found that the compe- 
tent, incurably ill adult does have a right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment unless the state can demonstrate a compelling counter- 
vailing interest.85 The only question that has provoked controversy 
is whether this right to privacy may be invoked by an incompetent 
individual, and if so, how, and by whom.86 
Classically, there are four distinct state interests, flowing generally 
from the state's role as parens patriae, which have been weighed 
against the individual's privacy right. These are: the interest in pre- 
serving life, the interest in preventing suicide, the interest in pro- 
moting the ethical integrity of the medical profession, and the 
by the fact that the trespassing physician was not an employee of the hospital, but rather 
an independent contractor rendering his services there. 
In Praft v. Davis, the Illinois Supreme Court held that, as a general proposition, a 
mentally competent patient's consent is required as a prerequisite to surgery. 224 Ill. 
300, 305, 79 N.E. 562,564 (1906). 
82. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-81 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 409 U.S. 
1064 (1972); Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d 285, 291-92, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 311-12, 
61 1 P.2d 902, 905-06 (1980); Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393,400-12, 350 P.2d 1093, 
1099-1 108 (1960). 
83. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780-81; Natanson, 186 Kan. at 407,350 P.2d at 1104. For 
an intriguing and unconventional account of the psychodynamics of the doctor-patient 
relationship as they relate to informed consent, see R. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRAN- 
GERS 102-04, 107, 119-20 (1979). 
84. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782. There is continuing controversy as to whether the 
doctrine of informed consent sounds in negligence or in battery. Sidarvay v. Bethlehem 
Royal Hosp. Governors, 1 All E.R. 643 (House of Lords 1985); Katz, Informed Consenf-A 
Faity Tale? Law? Vision, 39 U. PI?T L. REV. 137, 165 (1977). 
85. E.6,  Quinlun, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626; 
In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332,339 (Minn. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 
379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). 
86. See, e .6 ,  Brophy, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (permitting a guardian ad litem 
to assert constitutional rights for an incompetent person); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 
420 N.E.2d 64,438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (discussing a parent's ability to terminate medical care 
for an adult incompetent child), cerf. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Quinlun, 70 NJ. 10,355 
A.2d 647 (allowing the father, as legal guardian, to assert his incompetent daughter's 
right to refuse treatment). 
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interest in protecting innocent third parties.87 Although these inter- 
ests would appear to be substantial, in virtually every case in which a 
guardian or family member of an incurably ill, incompetent patient 
has asserted that individual's right to privacy, these four counter- 
vailing state interests have not been found ~ompe l l ing .~~  As the 
New Jersey Supreme Court declared in In re Quinlan, "as the degree 
of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis [for eventual recov- 
ery to a cognitive, sapient existence] dims," the state's interests 
wane.89 This has been the holding not only in cases in which the 
incompetent adult is terminally ill, such as a patient dying of cancer 
or of a progressively debilitating neurological disease,gO but also in 
the case of individuals like Karen Ann Quinlan and Paul Brophy, 
who although unconscious, were not in immediate peril of death.gl 
B. Consequences of the Autonomy Model 
Reflecting the high priority our society places upon respect for 
individual autonomy and self-determination, in the last dozen years, 
courts'and legislatures that have grappled with the problem of deci- 
sionmaking for the incompetent incurably ill have developed a vari- 
ety of substitute decisionmaking alternatives that seek to effectuate 
the right of personal choice. These include two vehicles by which a 
competent adult can elect in advance the desired treatment ap- 
proach should she become incurably ill and incompetent-the living 
will and the designated treatment agent-as well as several forms of 
judicial and less formal decisionmaking that provide for a substitute 
decisionmaker to act on the patient's behalf if he becomes incompe- 
tent. Each of these alternatives will be explored below. 
I .  Living Wills 
By far the most well-known of the advance directives for substi- 
tute decisionmaking are "living wills." Originally proposed by Doc- 
tor Louis Kutner in the late 1960s,9* and popularized by such 
groups as the Society for the Right to Die and Concern for Dying, a 
living will provides a mechanism by which a competent adult can 
designate in a legally binding manner the particular treatment or 
87. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 424-26; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40-41, 
355 A.2d at 663-64. 
88. E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Brophy, 398 Mass. 417,497 
N.E.2d 626 (1986); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 
1984); T o m ,  357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417; 
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647. But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,424 (Mo. 
1988) (en banc) (finding that the state interest in preserving life outweighed the privacy 
interests of a patient who was in a persistent vegetative state but not incurably ill). 
89. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664. 
90. Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 3, 426 N.E.2d 809, 810 
(C.P. 1980) (involving a patient suffering from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis). 
91. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 655; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 425,497 N.E.2d at 
630. 
92. Martyn &Jacobs, Legislating Advance Directives for the Tminal ly  Ill: The Living lRll 
and Durable Power of Attorney, 63 NEB. L. REV. 779, 787 (1984); see Kutner, Due Process of 
Euthanasia: The Living Will, A Proposal, 44 IND. L. J. 539,550-54 (1969), cited in Garrard, 
Right lo Forego Medical Treatment, 30 RES GESTAE 113 (1986). 
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non-treatment that he wishes to receive should he become termi- 
nally ill and incompetent. To date thirty-eight states and the District 
of Columbia have enacted "living will," "death with dignity," or 
"natural death" statutes,93 in part because of the deficiencies of the 
judicial model of substitute decisionmaking, discussed below. These 
statutes build on the constitutional and common law right to privacy 
and individual autonomy, often declaring in a formal preamble that 
each individual has a right to choose for himself the appropriate 
form of treatment or non-treatmentYg4 and that a directive made in 
advance by a competent adult shall be binding on her physician and 
family if she later becomes incompetent. 
Under a typical living will statute, a competent, non-pregnant95 
93. These states are: ALA. CODE $9  22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ALASKA STAT. $0 18.12.010 to -.I00 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $5 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. 
STAT. ANN. $5 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1987); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $3 7185- 
7195 (Deering Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. $3 15-18-101 to -1 13 (1987); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. $8 19a-570 to -575 (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, $9 2501-2509 
(1983); D.C. CODE ANN. $ 3  6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. $3 765.01- 
765.15 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. $9  31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1988); HAW. REV. 
STAT. $9  327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE $$ 39-4501 to -4508 (1986 & Supp. 
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 701-710 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. $8 16- 
8-11-1 to -22 (West 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. $9  144A.1 to -.I1 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. $0 65-3209 to -3218 (1985 & Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $0 40:1299.58.1 to -.lo (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, $0 2921-2931 
(Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN., $3 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE 
ANN. $5 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. $$ 459.010 to -.055 (Vernon 
Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. $9  50-9-101 to -206 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
449.540 to -.690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $$ 137-H:l to -:16 
(Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. $5 24-7-1 to -10 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. $8 90-320 to 
-323 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, $ 3  3101-31 11 (West Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. 
$0 97.050 to -.090 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. $ 3  44-77-10 to -110 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. $8 32-1 1-101 to -1 10 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. $5 75-2-1 101 to -1 118 (Supp. 1988); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, $5 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. $ 3  54.1-2981 to -2992 
(1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $3 70.122.010 to -.905 (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE 
$5 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. $8 154.01 to -.I5 (West Supp. 1988); WYO. 
STAT. $9  35-22-101 to -109 (1988). 
Even in jurisdictions that have not enacted a living will statute, such a document will 
often be considered persuasive evidence of the now incompetent patient's wishes. See, 
e.g., John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921,926 (Fla. 1984) (stating that a 
living will, if executed while an individual was competent, would be persuasive evidence 
of the incompetent individual's intention). 
94. A number of living will statutes emphasize that the statute itself does not create 
this right to privacy and self-determination, but merely recognizes its existence and 
makes it easier to be effectuated. ALA. CODE $ 22-8A-2 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $0 49-701 to -704 (Supp. 1988); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 7186 (Deering Supp. 
1987); COLO. REV. STAT. $ 15-18-102(a) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, $ 2502 (1983); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 765.02 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. $ 31-32-1(d) (1985); HAW. REV. 
STAT. $ 327D-1 (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE $ 39-4502 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. 
$ 16-8-1 1-1 (West Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. $ 144A.1 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. $ 40:1299.58.l(A)(l) (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 137-H:l 
(Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 90-320(a) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. 44-77-10 (Law Co- 
op. Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. $ 75-2-1 102(2) (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 
$ 5251 (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. $ 70.122.010 (Supp. 1989). 
95. The question of the extent to which the state may properly place limitations 
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adult may execute a written document, witnessed by two disinter- 
ested persons,96 which states that should the declarant later become 
terminally ill97 and incompetent, sustained only by "artificial" life 
support systems, he wishes not to receive further medical treat- 
ment.98 The declarant may indicate a particular form or forms of 
treatment which he chooses not to receive, or he may make a more 
general statement that he wishes no medical treatment what- 
soever.g9 The statutes in many jurisdictions provide a form for the 
living wi11,'OO but jurisdictions differ as to whether this form is 
-- - - 
upon a pregnant woman's right to control her own body in order to protect the health of 
the fetus is a complex and controversial one that is receiving increasing judicial scrutiny 
today. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 86-90, 274 
S.E.2d 457, 458-62 (1981). 
96. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 5s 16-8-1 1-1 1 to -12 (West Supp. 1988) (providing that 
a person who is at least 18 years of age and of sound mind may execute a written living 
will, witnessed by two disinterested persons). 
97. Only two states-Arkansas and New Mexico-provide for a living will to become 
effective in circumstances other than terminal illness. New Mexico provides that a living 
will be effective if the declarant is either terminally ill or in an "irreversible coma," de- 
fined as "that state in which brainstem functions remain but the major components of 
the cerebrum are irreversibly destroyed." N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 24-7-2(B) (1986). The 
Arkansas statute articulates somewhat broad definitions of "life sustaining treatment" 
and "terminal condition," which make it possible for a competent adult to execute a 
declaration to become effective if he either "should have an incurable or irreversible 
condition that will cause [his] death within a relatively short time" or if he should be- 
come "permanently unconscious," defined as "a lasting condition, indefinitely without 
change in which thought, feeling, sensations, and awareness of self and environment are 
absent." ARK. STAT. ANN. $5 20-17-20 1 (4)(a), 20-17-20 1 (ii), 20-17-202 (Supp. 1987). 
Most statutes define "terminally ill" or "terminal condition"; however, others do not. 
Compare ALASKA STAT. $ 18.12.100 (1986) (" 'terminal condition' means a progressive 
incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-sustaining 
procedures, will, in the opinion of two physicians, when available, who have personally 
examined the patient, one of whom must be the attending physician, result in death 
within a relatively short time") with D.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-2421(6) (Supp. 1988) (" 'Termi- 
nal condition' means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, 
regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable 
medical judgment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining proce- 
dures serve only to postpone the moment of death . . . ."). 
98. Many of the statutory definitions of "terminal condition," "imminent death," 
and "artificial life-sustaining treatment" are interdependent, if not circular. See, e.g., 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 5 2501 (e) (1983) (" 'Terminal condition' shall mean any disease, 
illness or condition sustained by any human being from which there is no reasonable 
medical expectation of recovery and which, as a medical probability, will result in the 
death of such human being regardless of the use or discontinuance of medical treatment 
implemented for the purpose of sustaining life or the life processes."). 
99. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 5 75-2-1 104 (Supp. 1988) (providing a standard direc- 
tive form in which the declarant may direct that all life-sustaining procedures be with- 
held or withdrawn if he is terminally ill, but that life-sustaining treatment does not 
include the provision of medication, sustenance, or comfort care, unless specifically so 
indicated by the declarant). 
100. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 5 7188 (Deering Supp. 1988), which pro- 
vides the follorving mandatory form: 
DIRECTIVE T O  PHYSICIANS Directive made this - day of - (month, 
year). 
I , being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily make known my 
desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances 
set forth below, do hereby declare: 
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness certi- 
fied to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application 
of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially prolong the mo- 
ment of my death and where my physician determines that my death is immi- 
nent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized, I direct that such 
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mandatory or suggested.lo1 Some statutes specifically exclude nu- 
trition and hydration or medication, or both, from the definition of 
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die 
naturally. 
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such 
life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be 
honored by my family and physician(s) as the final expression of my legal 
right to refuse medical or  surgical treatment and accept the consequences 
from such refusal. 
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my 
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my 
pregnancy. 
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as having a ter- 
minal condition by , M.D., whose address is , and 
whose telephone number is . I understand that if I have not filled 
in the physician's name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have 
a terminal condition when I made out this directive. 
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled 
in above. 
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and 
mentally competent to make this directive. 
Signed 
City, County and State of Residence 
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her to 
be of sound mind. 
Witness 
Witness 
10 1. See, e.g., Colorado's suggested, but non-mandatory form: 
DECLARATION AS T O  MEDICAL OR SURGICAL TREATMENT 
I, (name of declarant), being of sound mind and at least eighteen years of 
age, direct that my Iife shall not be artificially prolonged under the circum- 
stances set forth below and hereby declare that: 
1. If at any time my attending physician and one other physician certify in 
writing that: 
a. I have an injury, disease, or illness which is not curable or reversible and 
which, in their judgment, is a terminal condition; and 
b. For a period of forty-eight consecutive hours or more, I have been un- 
conscious, comatose, or otherwise incompetent so as to be unable to make 
or  communicate responsible decisions concerning my person; then 
I direct that life-sustaining procedures shall be withdrawn and withheld, it 
being understood that life-sustaining procedures shall not include any medi- 
cal procedure or intervention for nourishment or considered necessary by 
the attending physician to provide comfort or alleviate pain. 
2. I execute this declaration, as my free and voluntary act, this 
day of 19-. 
Declarant 
The foregoing instrument was signed and declared by to be 
his declaration, in the presence of us, who, in his presence, in the presence 
of each other, and at his request, have signed our names below as witnesses, 
and we declare that, at the time of the execution of this instrument, the de- 
clarant, according to our best knowledge and belief, was of sound mind and 
under no constraint or undue influence. 
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life-sustaining treatment;*o* others are silent on this point.103 
Florida, Indiana, and Maryland are the only jurisdictions that pro- 
vide for the alternative of a binding life prolonging declaration, under 
which a competent adult may indicate that should he become termi- 
nally ill, he wishes to receive all possible treatment.lo4 Florida, Lou- 
isiana, and Virginia also recognize the validity of an oral living will 
declaration. lo5 
To ensure that a living will is not used inappropriately, legislative 
drafters have provided a number of safeguards. Many jurisdictions 
require that the document be witnessed by two disinterested per- 
sons, who may not be relatives, potential beneficiaries, persons fi- 
nancially responsible for the declarant's medical care, or health care 
providers to the declarant.106 All living will statutes require that at 
least one, and usually two, physicians certify that the declarant is 
terminally ill.lO7 As an additional precaution, all living will statutes 
provide for the easy revocation of a living will, either by a written or 
oral statement to that effect, or by defacing or obliterating the 
will.lOS Although living will statutes are premised on the declarant's 
competence at the time the living will is executed, many statutes fail 
to require competency at the time of revocation, either implicitly or 
explicitly disregarding competency as an issue. log 
To provide physicians and other health care providers with an 
Dated at , Colorado, this day of 
,19-. 
Name and Address 
Name and Address 
COL. REV. STAT. 3 15-18-104 (1987). 
For a helpful discussion of the pros and cons of mandatory versus recommended liv- 
ing will forms, see Marsh, Living Will Legislation in Colorado: An Analysis of the Colorado 
Medical Treatment Decision Act in Relation to Similar Dmelopments in Other Jurisdictions, 64 
DENVER U.L. REV. 5, 10-1 1 (1987). 
102. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 75-2-1 103(6)(b) (Supp. 1988) (expressly excluding 
medication, sustenance or any procedure that provides comfort or alleviates pain from 
the definition of life-sustaining procedure, unless the declarant indicates otherwise); see 
also AMA COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 2.18 (defining life prolonging medical treatment 
to include the provision of food and hydration). 
103. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 24-7-2(C) (1978) (defining "maintenance medical 
treatment" as "medical treatment designed solely to sustain the life processes" without 
further explanation). 
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. 765.02 (West 1986); IND. CODE 16-8-1 1-1 1 (g), 16-8-1 1-12 
(1984); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. $ 5-61 1 (1988). 
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. 765.02 (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.58.3(A)(3) 
(West 1977); VA. CODE ANN. 54.1-2982 (1988). 
106. E.g., ALA. CODE 22-8A-4(a) (1984). 
107. E.g., ALASKA STAT. 38 18.12.010(a), 18.12.030 (1986); ARIZ. CODE 36-3202(C) 
(1 F)S6). I---- 
108:- E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.06 (West 1986) ; see also TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. 
art. 4590h 4A (Vernon 1987) (providing that a competent patient's present desire 
shall always supersede a directive). 
109. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. 15-18-109 (1987) ("A declaration may be revoked 
by the declarant orally, in writing, or by burning, tearing, cancelling, obliterating, or 
destroying said declaration."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 2504(a) (1983) ("A declarant 
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incentive to comply with a living will, all living will and natural death 
statutes exempt the complying health care provider from criminal 
and civil liability for her actions.l10 A physician who feels it ethically 
or professionally inappropriate to comply with a patient's living will 
must transfer the patient to another physician who will comply.fll 
Most statutes, however, provide no sanction for a physician's failure 
to comply with an advance directive.112 Only a few states punish a 
.cvillful failure to transfer either as a minor crime or an occasion for 
professional censure. l3 
Living wills have been widely criticized as inadequate to achieve 
their laudable goal of promoting individual autonomy and permit- 
ting hopelessly ill patients to free themselves from a prolonged and 
painful dying. Many patients are unable to take advantage of a liv- 
ing will statute, either because they do not know about it or because 
its provisions do not encompass their situation. 
Significantly, many physicians are uncomfortable about discussing 
death, and may even be reluctant to tell a patient that he is termi- 
nally ill. Thus, numerous patients are unlikely to recognize the need 
to make a living will, or to have the time to execute it before they 
lapse into unconsiousness.l l4 This is obviously so with accident vic- 
tims, but it is also so with many people whose chronic degenerative 
disease takes a sudden turn for the worse. 
Further, even if a patient desires to execute an advance treatment 
directive, few physicians have living will forms available. Nor do 
many physicians either know, or understand, the requirements of 
the living will act in their jurisdiction. 115 Consequently, they are un- 
able to advise their patients, appropriately. 
In addition, a number of incurably ill patients are not terminally 
i11.116 These include those in a persistent vegetative state, those 
may revoke his declaration at any time, without regard to his mental state or 
competency."). 
110. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 5 2927 (Supp. 1985). Some statutes state ex- 
plicitly that the physician must be acting in good faith in order to invoke this exemption. 
E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110-1/2 para. 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). 
1 1 1. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. 5 327D- 1 1 (b) (Supp. 1988). 
112. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 137-H:1-16 (Supp. 1985). 
113. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 5 2928(1) (Supp. 1985) (providing that a 
physician who fails to transfer is guilty of a "Class E crime"); IND. CODE ANN. 5 16-8-1 1- 
22 (West Supp. 1988) (providing that a physician who knowingly violates his patient's 
wishes will be subject to disciplinary sanctions by the state medical licensing board). 
114. Note, The Cal$ornia Nafural Death Acf: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Pradices, 31 
STAN. L. REV. 913, 928, 938 (1979). Only the District of Columbia requires a physician 
to inform a patient of his terminal illness, and then only if the patient is alert and com- 
municative. D.C. CODE ANN. 5 6-2425(b) (Supp. 1983); Martyn &Jacobs, supra note 92, 
at 790. 
115. Note, supra note 114, at 930-33. 
116. At least one commentator has noted the irony that those who fall within the 
typical living will statute are the least in need of its benefits. Referring to the California 
Natural Death Act, Alexander Capron writes: 
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suffering from a chronic degenerative disease, and those suffering 
from a condition that is hopeless but not expected to produce death 
in the near future."' Further, because of the pervasive use in the 
living will statutes of vague and sometimes circular definitions of 
such crucial terms as "terminally ill," "imminent death," " 'artificial' 
life sustaining treatment," many physicians lack guidance about 
whether a particular living will is effective.118 Thus, they may be 
disinclined to honor it, or honor it only at the eleventh hour.I1g In a 
leading survey of physician practices in California, researchers 
found that many physicians defined "imminent death" to mean 
death within the relatively short time periods of forty-eight hours, 
one week or one month. Although such a definition may be appro- 
priate clinically, reflecting the need for certainty in prognosis, it may 
make the beneficial effects of a natural death act illusory to all but a 
few terminally ill patients.lZ0 
But perhaps the key drawback of the living will is its inherent in- 
flexibility. The essence of a living will is the function it serves as an 
advance directive for medical treatment decisions. Yet, it is difficult, 
if not virtually impossible, for any adult to indicate with specificity 
the types of medical treatment she might wish to forego should she 
become incurably ill or  incompetent. This is so both because what 
seems like a grave imposition on the quality of life to a thirty year 
old might appear to be an entirely reasonable restriction at the age 
of seventy,l21 and also because it is difficult to foresee precisely the 
type of incompetency and incurable illness that might occur.lZ2 
. - 
If the declarant deals with this uncertainty by drawing a sweeping 
living will that refuses all forms of treatment under any circum- 
stances, he takes the chance that this will turn out to be medically 
inappropriate, and either dishonored by the physician under a kind 
of medical "void for overbreadth" principle, or honored by the physi- 
cian out of deference to the declarant's autonomy. IZ3 Alternatively, 
if the declarant tailors her advance directive to a particular situation, 
she runs the risk either that the predicted illness will not materialize, 
thus rendering the living will inapplicable, or that her individualiza- 
[Tlhe only patients covered by this statute are those who are on the edge of 
death despite the doctors'eforts. The very people for whom the greatest concern 
is expressed about a prolonged and undignified dying process are unaffected 
by the statute because their deaths are not imminent. 
Capron, The Development of Law on Human Death, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 45, 55 
(1978), cited in COMM'N REPORT, supra note 8, at 143. 
1 17. This group includes those whose prognosis is hopeless but who will not die soon 
unless mechanically supplied food and hydration or antibiotics are withdrawn. It is thus 
critical to have a clear definition of "artificial" medical treatment. 
118. Note, supra note 114, at 920-21. 
119. Id. at 920 n.31. 
120. Id. at 921 n.38, 932. 
12 1. In re Conroy, 98 N J. 32 1, 362-63,486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (1985); see ako Hilfiker, 
supra note 24, at 718 (comparing different views of what constitutes a reasonable physi- 
cal limitation on life activities of a person at different life stages). 
122. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 524, 531 N.E.2d 607, 
625, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 904 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting). 
123. Id. at 537, 531 N.E.2d at 617, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (Hancock, J., concurring). 
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tion of the living will renders it unenforceable in her jurisdiction.124 
Other procedural safeguards, designed to minimize the risks of an 
inappropriate termination of medical treatment in reliance on a liv- 
ing will, often result in preventing the advance declaration from be- 
coming effective when it should. For example, California's 
fourteen-day waiting period125 after the diagnosis of a terminal ill- 
ness means that the living wills of persons who become incompetent 
before the fourteen days have passed are not binding, but are advi- 
sory only. Automatic expiration periods, like that in California,l26 
mean that many people who forget to "renew" their living wills will 
find them of no use. And unusual filing requirements, like that of 
Mississippi, which requires that all living wills be filed with the 
Mississippi Board of Health's Bureau of Vital  statistic^,^^^ mean that 
the advance directives of many individuals will be rendered 
nugatory. 128 
Other criticisms of living will statutes come from quite a different 
perspective. Some commentators suggest that the blanket elimina- 
tion of civil and criminal liability may encourage physicians to be 
negligent in the diagnosis or prognosis of terminal illnesses, or in 
their treatment of the elderly and incompetent.129 Given the diffi- 
culty that many patients and physicians have in communicating with 
each other, which may lead to the withholding of important infor- 
mation relevant to diagnosis and prognosisY130 there is some ground 
for concern about a blanket exemption. 
124. Four states--California, Idaho, North Carolina, and Oregon-have mandatory 
living will forms, while thirty-three others have permissive statutes, which only suggest a 
standard form of declaration. Two other states-Delaware, and New Mexico-provide 
no form at all. 
Some statutes directly address the question of the severability of the invalid portions 
of a living will from the valid ones, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 765.05(2) (West 1986) 
("Should any . . . specific direction [other than the designation of a medical treatment 
agent] be held to be invalid, such invalidity will not affect the declaration."), although 
others are silent on this issue. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. 3 144A.3(3) (West Supp. 1988) 
(providing for a living will, but silent as to severability of invalid directions). 
125. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE $ 3  7188, 7191 (Deering Supp. 1988). 
126. In California, a living will automatically expires after five years. Id. 3 7188. 
127. Vitiello, Death with Dignity in Mississippi? An Analysis of Mississippi's Natural Death 
Acl, 54 MISS. L.J. 459,472 (1984) (citing MISS. CODE ANN. 3 41-41-107(2) (Supp. 1984)). 
128. That such an apparently simple procedural requirement can become a substan- 
tial obstacle was demonstrated by a survey of attorneys attending a seminar on the Mis- 
sissippi Natural Death Act. Of the twenty-two lawyers responding to the seminar survey, 
only three were aware of the filing requirement, even immediately after the presenta- 
tion. Id. at 486 n.193. 
129. Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J .  L. AND MED. 233, 
241-42 (1978); Note, The Virginia Natural Death Act-A Crilical Analysis, 17 U .  RICH. L. 
REV. 863, 872-73 (1983). 
130. See Branch, Doctors as "Healers'? Striving to Reach Our Potential, 2 J .  GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 356, 358-59 (1987) (suggesting that difficulties in patient-physician communica- 
tion often impair physicians' abilities to be accurate in diagnosis and prognosis). 
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2. Designating a Medical Treatment Agent 
Acknowledging that living wills are in many ways inadequate, thir- 
teen states have enacted laws that authorize a competent adult to 
designate someone to make treatment decisions on her behalf 
should she become incompetent131 and, in some cases, terminally 
i11.'3* Eight of these states authorize this designation to be made in 
the same document that the patient would use to make a living 
~ i 1 1 . l ~ ~  However, Alaska, California, Nevada, Rhode Island and 
Vermont, perhaps recognizing the rigidity that inevitably attends 
the advance direction of either a blanket refusal of all medical treat- 
ment or of specific medical practices, provide for the designation of 
a medical treatment agent to be made in a separate document, pro- 
viding for a durable power of attorney for health care 
decisionmaking. 
States have adopted a variety of different approaches. Alaska's 
unusual statutory scheme permits a competent adult to nominate a 
substitute decisionmaker to make medical treatment decisions on 
her behalf should she become incompetent, but does not authorize 
the treatment agent to seek the termination of medical treatment un- 
less the patient has also executed a living will specifically directing 
the refusal of such treatment.135 Both Colorado and Pennsylvania 
have enacted durable power of attorney statutes that expressly au- 
thorize a principal to designate an agent who can consent to medical 
treatment, but appear to preclude the agent from refusing treatment 
on the principal's behalf.136 Maine's durable power of attorney stat- 
ute expressly permits a designated agent to consent to or to refuse 
treatment for the principal, but is silent as to whether such a refusal 
could be made when the consequence would be the principal's 
death.l37 Finally, an additional thirty-three states have enacted 
131. ALASKA STAT. $ 5  13.26.332--356 (Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE 2410-43 (Deer- 
ing 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 765.02, 765.05(2) 
(West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. 144A.7 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
40: 1299.58.1 (A)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 5  449.800-360 
(Michie Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS $ 5  23.4.10-1 to -2 (Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN. art. 4509h (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 75-2-1106 (Supp. 
1988); VA. CODE § 54.1-2984 (1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988); 
and WYO. STAT. ANN. 35-22-102(d) (1988). 
132. The Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia, and Wyoming statutes provide 
that the designation of a medical treatment agent is effective only when the declarant 
becomes "terminally ill." T o  the extent that this excludes patients who are incurably, 
but not terminally ill (see supra notes 97, 107, 114-120, and accompanying text), the 
advance designation of a treatment agent suffers from the same weakness as a living will. 
133. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, 2502 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. $ 3  765.02, 765.05(2) 
(West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. 144A.7 (West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
40:1299.58.1(A)(3)(a) (West Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h $ 3(e) 
(Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 8 75-2-1 106 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. 
54.1-2984 (1988); and WYO. STAT. ANN. 35-22-102(d) (1988). 
134. ALASKA STAT. $3 13.26.332-.356 (Supp. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE $ 5  2410-2443 
(Deering 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 449.800-.860 (Michie 1986); R.I. GEN. LA~VS 
$ 5  23.4.10-1 to -2 (Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, $8 3451-3467 (Supp. 1988). 
135. ALASKA STAT. $3 13.26.332, .335, .344(i)(2) and (I) (Supp. 1988). 
136. COLO. REV. STAT. 8 15-14-501 (1987); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 8 5603(h) (Supp. 
1988). 
137. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, 5-501 (Supp. 1988). 
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durable power of attorney acts that are silent about whether the 
principal may appoint an agent to make health care decisions on her 
behalf, as opposed to a myriad of other issues affecting the princi- 
pal's person or property.138 Of these states, only New Jersey has, 
through its supreme court, recognized the existing durable power of 
attorney statute as an appropriate vehicle for designating a medical 
treatment agent.139 
State statutes permitting the advance designation of a medical 
treatment agent grow out of the same desire to protect the patient's 
right to autonomy and personal choice in the making of medical 
treatment that underlies the living will, but they achieve their goal 
much more effectively. Utah explicitly recognizes this principle of 
self-determination, providing that the competent patient will select 
a treatment agent "with confidence in the belief that this person's 
familiarity with my desires, beliefs, and attitudes will result in direc- 
tions to attending physicians and providers of medical services 
which would probably be the same as I would give if able to do 
~ 0 . ~ ~ ~ 0  Similarly. the Florida and Iowa statutes expressly state that 
in making their decision, the treatment agent and physician are to 
138. ALA. CODE $ 26-1-2 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 3  14-5501 to -5502 (1975); 
ARK. STAT. ANN. $9 28-68-201 to -203, -301 to -313 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §$ 21-2081 
to -2085 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. $ 10-6-36 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. $9 560:5-501 
to -502 (1982); IDAHO CODE $9  15-5-501 to -507 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. $9 30-2- 
11-1 to -7 (West Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. $9  58-610 to -617 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. $ 386.093 (Baldwin 1983); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3002 (West 1973); MD. EST. & 
TRUSTS CODE ANN. $9 13-601 to -603 (1987 & Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201B, 
$ 1-7 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS $ 565.631 (West 1988); MISS. CODE 
ANN. $5 87-3-1 to -17 (1972 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. 93 486.550 to -595 (Vernon 
1987); NEB. REV. STAT. $3 30-2664 to -2672 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $9 506:5 to :7 
(1983 & Supp. 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. $ 46:2B-8 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
$0 45-5-501 to -502 (1978); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW 99 5-150 1 to -1601 (Consol. 1987); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. $9 32A-1 to -14 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE $5 30.1-30-01 to -05 (Supp. 
1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $5 1337.01 to .10 (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
58, $5 1051-1062 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. $9 126.407,413 (1987); S.C. CODE 
ANN. $ 62-5-501 to -502 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. $9 59-7-2.1 to .4 
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. $5 34-6-101 to -107 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
$0 11.94.010 to .060 (1987); W. VA. CODE $9  39-4-1 to -7 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
9 243.07 (West 1987). 
139. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378-79, 529 A.2d 419,426 (1987); see infra notes 201- 
06 and accompanying text. 
The New York Attorney General has expressed uncertainty as to whether New York's 
durable power of attorney could be used to confer broad medical decisionmaking power 
on a designated treatment agent. Noting that "section 5-1601 [of the New York General 
Obligations Law] and its history do not reflect a legislative intent either to grant or to 
deny an agent the power to make health care decisions for an incompetent principal," 
1984 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. 58, 59 (1984), the Attorney General suggested that a durable 
power of attorney could best be used in a more limited way, like a living will, to "specifi- 
cally delegate to an agent the responsibility to communicate the principal's decision to 
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances." Id. at 60. 
140. UTAH CODE ANN. 9 75-2-1 106 (Supp. 1988). 
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be "guided by the express or implied intentions of the patient."141 
Indeed, the very fact of designating a treatment agent enhances the 
patient's rights of self-determination and privacy in decisionmaking. 
Because the competent adult can nominate in advance a person 
whom he trusts, and who knows him well, he is given the peace of 
mind that comes from knowing that the ultimate treatment decision 
will be one that is both consonant with his moral and religious be- 
liefs, and as close as possible to the one that he would have made 
himself, because it will be based upon accurate, up-to-date medical 
information. 142 
The designation of a treatment agent is a significant advance over 
the living will, because it provides for intelligent and informed dis- 
cussion between the treatment agent and the patient's physician. 
Because the treatment agent can both provide the attending physi- 
cian with important background information concerning the pa- 
tient's health and life habits, increasing the accuracy of the diagnosis 
and prognosis made, and can also consider the medical information 
conveyed by the physician in light of the totality of the patient's life, 
values, and beliefs, she can carefully tailor a treatment decision to 
be consistent with the patient's medical and moral needs. The 
designation of a medical treatment agent eliminates the risk that the 
physician will either refuse to comply with an advance treatment di- 
rective that he believes to be too sweeping in scope, or that he will 
honor it, no matter what the circumstances. 
The designation of a treatment agent is thus an alternative that 
promotes conversation, compassion, and caring.143 The attending 
physician is not bound to follow reflexively the advance directive of 
a living will, but must consult with the patient's designated treat- 
ment agent so that the agent may determine a course that is both 
medically appropriate and consistent with the patient's values and 
desires. 
3. Judicial and Less Formal Decisionmaking 
A dozen years ago, resort to the judiciary to seek prior authoriza- 
tion to terminate medical treatment of an incomptetent, incurably ill 
adult was virtually unknown. In many cases, physicians made these 
decisions alone,144 and frequently doctors and family members 
made these decisions together.145 It was not until the late 1970s, 
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 765-07(1) (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 144A.7(1) (West 
Supp. 1988). 
142. See Cantor, supra note 44, at 547-48, 555-56. Yet even then the decision that is 
made can only be an approximation, a "best guess" as to what the person whose death is 
near would choose if he were now competent. See Beschle, supra note 39, at 360. 
143. See infra discussion in Section I11 of text. 
144. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 47, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (discussing testimonial and 
other evidence "that humane decisions against resuscitative or maintenance therapy are 
frequently a recognized a'e facto response in the medical world to the irreversible, termi- 
nal, pain-ridden patient"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
145. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 524, 531 N.E.2d 607, 
626, 539 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting); In re conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 
345, 486 A.2d 1209, 1227-28 (1985). 
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and the paradigmatic cases of In re @inlan146 and Superintendent of 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewin, 14' that the judiciary became ac- 
tively involved in the disposition of such cases. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Quinlan, and the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in Saikewin, acted on the basis of a shared 
constitutional and common law view of the right to privacy.148 They 
also agreed on the important state interests that must be balanced 
against the patient's right to privacy in determining whether, in a 
particular case, the patient may elect to terminate medical treatment 
when that will lead her to death: the state's interest in preserving 
human life, preventing suicide, maintaining the ethical integrity of 
the medical profession, and protecting the interests of innocent 
third parties.149 Yet, despite their common starting point, the think- 
ing of these two state courts has evolved very differently, so that the 
two courts currently assert conflicting views of the appropriate 
means of protecting a person's right to choose the course of his 
medical treatment when he is incapable of exercising it personally. 
a. The Massachusetts Model 
The Massachusetts substituted judgment model has evolved in a 
series of decisions, beginning with the landmark case of Superinten- 
h t  of Belchertown State School v. Saikewin and continuing through 
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital. 151 In these decisions, the Mas- 
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken as its central precept 
the fundamental constitutional and common law right to privacy 
and self-determination, which it has held must be balanced against 
the state interests in the preservation of life, the prevention of sui- 
cide, the promotion of the ethical integrity of the medical profes- 
sion, and the protection of innocent third parties. The court has 
consistently rejected the possibility of a nonjudicial substitute deci- 
sionmaker, and accordingly, has devised a highly formalized and 
complex set of procedures for substitute decisionmaking on behalf 
of incompetent, incurably ill adults. 
In Saikewin, the patient was a severely retarded sixty-seven-year- 
old man who had been diagnosed with incurable leukemia. 
146. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
147. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
148. Saikewin, 373 Mass. at 739-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 38-42, 
355 A.2d at 662-64. 
149. Saikewicr, 373 Mass. at 740-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27; Quinlan, 70 N J. at 40-43, 
355 A.2d at 663-65. The Quinlan court did not mention the state interest in protecting 
innocent parties, presumably because none were involved in that case, but the New 
Jersey Supreme Court subsequently recognized all four state interests noted here. In re 
Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348-49, 529 A.2d 404, 410-1 1 (1987). 
150. 373 Mass. 728. 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). 
151. 398 Mass. 417; 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986j. 
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Although chemotherapy would normally have been prescribed as a 
temporary ameliorative treatment, it would not significantly 
lengthen his life. Saikewicz's physicians were concerned that be- 
cause of his retardation, he would only perceive the pain of the 
treatment, without understanding its purpose.15* Because of 
Saikewicz's incompetence, a guardian ad litem was appointed to rep- 
resent him in proceedings brought before the probate court to de- 
termine whether treatment should be required. The probate court 
determined that treatment should not be ordered, and on appeal, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, articulating 
detailed procedures for making medical treatment decisions for the 
incompetent. 
The court found that the fundamental constitutional and common 
law right for a person to be "free from nonconsensual invasion of 
his bodily integrity"153 included the right to refuse medical treat- 
ment. Because this right is held equally by competent and incompe- 
tent people, courts must appoint a guardian to effectuate the 
incompetent person's privacy right by clearly articulating the posi- 
tion the guardian believes the incompetent would take if he were 
c0mpetent.l5~ After a hearing, the trial court must undertake a sub- 
stituted judgment on the patient's behalf, "attempt[ing] to ascer- 
tain the incompetent person's actual interests and preferences. . . . 
taking into account the present and future incompetency of the indi- 
vidual as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the 
decision-making pr0cess."l5~ 
The Saikewicz court strenuously rejected any possibility of a non- 
judicial decisionmaker. Although the trial judge might consider the 
views of the patient's family, physicians, and any institutional review 
committee that might exist, the court stated: 
We take a dim view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision- 
making responsibility away from the duly established courts of 
proper jurisdiction to any committee, panel or group, ad hoc or 
permanent. . . . 
We do not view the judicial resolution of this most difficult and 
awesome question . . . as constituting a "gratuitious encroach- 
ment" on the domain of medical expertise. Rather, such questions 
of life and death seem to us to require the process of detached but 
passionate investigation and decision that forms the ideal on 
which the judicial branch of government was created. Achieving 
this ideal is our responsibility and that of the lower court, and is 
not to be entrusted to any other group purporting to represent 
the "morality and conscience of our society," no matter how 
highly motivated or impressively ~ 0 n s t i t u t e d . l ~ ~  
In In re Spring '57 a case involving a seventy-nine-year-old senile 
152. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 734 & n.5, 370 N.E.2d at 421 & n.5. 
153. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424. 
154. Id. at 745, 756, 370 N.E.2d at 427, 433. 
155. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431. 
156. Id. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434-35. 
157. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980). 
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incompetent who was receiving life-prolonging kidney dialysis, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again emphasized the superi- 
ority of the judicial model for substitute decisionmaking for incom- 
petent, incurably ill patients. The court held that "it was error to 
delegate the decision [to terminate treatment] to the attending phy- 
sician and the ward's wife and son."l58 Although ostensibly declar- 
ing that resort to the judiciary was not necessarily required in every 
caseY159 the court enumerated such a lengthy list of factors to be 
considered in determining whether judicial authorizaton to 
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment was requiredl60 that it 
virtually ensured that no Massachusetts physician would ever termi- 
nate such medical treatment without a judicial imprimatur. 
Spring was followed by In re Roe and Rogers v. Commissioner of the 
Department of Mental Health, 162 both decisions addressing the right of 
an incompetent mentally ill individual to refuse psychotropic medi- 
cation.lG3 In each, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied 
upon the fundamental right of privacy to hold that before someone 
can be forcibly medicated with antipsychotic drugs, he must first be 
adjudicated incompetent and have a guardian appointed on his be- 
half. Then, a court will make a substituted judgment for him, con- 
sidering six factors from the perspective of the incompetent if he 
could be temporarily rendered competent: (1) the patient's "ex- 
pressed preferences regarding treatment," (2) the "strength of the 
incompetent patient's religious convictions, to the extent that they 
may contribute to his refusal of treatment," (3) "the impact of the 
decision on the ward's family," (4) "the probability of adverse side 
effects," (5) "the prognosis without treatment," and (6) "the prog- 
nosis with treatment."164 
158. Id. at 630,405 N.E.2d at 117. 
159. Id. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120. 
160. The cburt declared that there are: 
a variety of circumstances to be taken into account in deciding whether there 
should be an application for a prior court order with respect to medical 
treatment of an incompetent patient. Among them are af  leusf the following: 
the extent of impairment of the patient's mental faculties, whether the pa- 
tient is in the custody of a State institution, the prognosis without the pro- 
posed treatment, the prognosis with the proposed treatment, the 
complexity, risk and novelty of the proposed treatment, its possible side ef- 
fects, the patient's level of understanding and probable reaction, the ur- 
gency of decision, the consent of the patient, spouse, or guardian, the good 
faith of those who participate in the decision, the clarity of professional opin- 
ion as to what is good medical practice, the interests of third persons, and 
the administrative requirements of any institution involved. 
Id. at 636-37, 405 N.E.2d at 120-21 (emphasis added). 
161. 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
162. 390 Mass. 489,458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
163. In Rogers, the incompetent individuals were civilly committed mental patients at 
a state hospital. In Roe, the incompetent was mentally ill and living at home. 
164. Rogers, 390 Mass. at 506, 458 N.E.2d at 318-19. 
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Most recently, in Brophy a. New England Sinai Hospital, 165 the Mas- 
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered a substituted judgment 
decision on behalf of Paul Brophy, a fire fighter who was in a persis- 
tent vegetative state following a stroke. As a result of this condition, 
Brophy was unable to swallow, and received food and water through 
a gastrostomy tube surgically implanted in his stomach. His death 
was not imminent because he could be maintained indefinitely in 
that condition. 
Brophy's guardian, his wife, sought to exercise Brophy's right to 
refuse all life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and 
hydration. When his physicians and the hospital objected, Brophy's 
wife brought suit. Relying on Brophy's repeated but general state- 
ments that he would never want to be maintained on life-support 
systems, which were made while he was competent, the Massachu- 
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that Brophy's right to self-deter- 
mination outweighed any competing state interest, even though it 
meant that he would die of starvation.166 Although the court dis- 
claimed any intention to make decisions based on the quality of the 
incompetent's life,167 it repeatedly emphasized the invasiveness of 
the gastrostomy tube and Brophy's helpless and demeaning condi- 
tion. Finessing the question of whether the state's interest in pre- 
serving life was paramount to Brophy's autonomy interest, the court 
declared: 
[W]e must recognize that the State's interest in life encompasses a 
broader interest than mere corporeal existence. In certain, thank- 
fully rare, circumstances the burden of maintaining the corporeal 
existence degrades the very humanity it was meant to serve. . . . 
The duty of the State to preserve life must encompass a recog- 
nition of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the 
individual himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or 
degrade his humanity.168 
Notwithstanding its decision that Brophy had a right to refuse life- 
sustaining treatment under these circumstances, the court held that 
his physicians should not be forced to remove his life-support sys- 
tem when they believed it ethically inappropriate to do so. Accord- 
ingly, the court held that the treating physicians should be ordered 
to assist in Brophy's transfer to another institution or his home, so 
that he could be allowed to die there.169 
In sum, the Massachusetts substituted judgment approach takes 
as its first precept the principle that an individual's right to privacy 
and autonomy can only be protected by the "detached but passion- 
ate" judgment of a court.I7O The underlying assumption of this 
preference for judicial decisionmaking-that judges, unlike other 
mortals, have a direct line to God-represents judicial hubris in the 
165. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986). 
166. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638. 
167. Id. at 434. 497 N.E.2d at 635. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 439-42, 497 N.E.2d at 638-40. 
170. Saikewia, 373 Mass. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435 . 
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extreme. A substituted judgment is just that, no matter who makes 
it: a best guess as to what the'incompetent patient would have cho- 
sen if he were able to discuss his condition with his doctor and voice 
his own treatment preference.171 Any substitute decision must inev- 
itably reflect the biases of the decisionmaker, no matter how hard 
she tries to remain "objective" and "detached," or to eschew 
decisions based upon the "quality of life."17* 
To elevate the substituted judgment to a higher, sacrosanct plane 
simply because it is a judge, rather than a family member or physi- 
cian, who is making the decision, is both presumptuous and ulti- 
mately destructive of the very autonomy interest that its advocates 
seek to preserve. Judicial proceedings are cumbersome and time- 
consuming. They also subject the incompetent and his family to the 
glare of the media spotlight, providing an opportunity for this most 
intimate of life's dramas to be played out daily in the newspapers 
and on the nightly news. In addition, rather than letting the incom- 
petent's family-those persons who are best suited to assess the pa- 
tient's wishes-deal with the tragedy of a difficult death privately, 
with the support of physicians and other health care personnel, the 
insistence on a judicial substituted judgment exacerbates the fam- 
ily's emotional upheaval. When resort to the courts is the preferred, 
if not the only, means of resolving differences of opinion within the 
family or between the family and physicians, it promotes distrust 
and the "fracture of human relationship,"l73 rather than dialogue, 
understanding, and mutual respect. 
b. The New Jersey Model 
From the outset of its involvement in decisionmaking for the in- 
curably ill adult, the New Jersey Supreme Court has expressed a 
preference that close family members act as substitute deci- 
sionmakers for the incompetent patient. In the landmark case of In 
re Quinlan, 174 the court recognized that the competent adult has a 
fundamental constitutional right to privacy and self-determination. 
Concerned that this right should not be lost merely because the 
adult became incompetent, the court declared that this right could 
be exercised by a guardian in such cases.175 Further, the court held 
specifically that the right to privacy encompassed the right to refuse 
171. Substituted judgment has been criticized as a legal fiction, United States v. 
Charters, 829 F.2d 479,498 (4th Cir. 1987), vacafed en banc on ofherg-ounds, 863 F.2d 302 
(1988), stay granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3545 (1989), inappropriately transferred from one legal 
context to another. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,425-26 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). 
172. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 434,497 N.E.2d at 635; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 367,486 A.2d 
at 1232-33. 
173. See C. GILLICAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 31 (1982). 
174. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cerf. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
175. Id. at. 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. 
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life-sustaining medical treatment when there was no chance of re- 
turning to a cognitive and sapient existence.176 Although the court 
found that under these circumstances no countervailing state inter- 
est could outweigh the patient's right to privacy,177 it was concerned 
that a decision to withdraw or withhold medical treatment not be 
reached hastily. Therefore, to guard against the risk of an errone- 
ous diagnosis or prognosis, and to ensure the preservation of medi- 
cal ethics, the guardian would be permitted to exercise the patient's 
right to privacy only after her hopeless diagnosis and prognosis had 
been confirmed by what the court termed an "ethics committeeM- 
in reality a medical prognosis committee.178 If the committee con- 
curred in the attending physician's diagnosis and prognosis, no 
criminal or civil liability would attach to the physician's conduct in 
discontinuing treatment. 179 As long as this procedure was followed, 
the court emphasized, it would not be necessary to seek prior judi- 
cial authorization for decisions to terminate treatment. 180 
Eight years later, in In re Conroy, lsl the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reexamined the question of substitute decisionmaking for the in- 
competent in the case of an elderly patient confined to a nursing 
home. Claire Conroy was an eighty-four-year-old woman who was 
conscious, but senile, displaying extremely limited interaction with 
her environment. She suffered from a variety of debilitating ill- 
nesses, and, because she had extreme difficulty in swallowing, was 
receiving food and water through a nasogastric tube.182 Conroy's 
nephew, who was also her guardian, sought to have her feeding tube 
removed, believing that his aunt would not have chosen to receive 
life-sustaining treatment under such circumstances,l83 although she 
had never made an explicit statement to that effect.ls4 
In Conroy, the New Jersey Supreme Court reiterated its recogni- 
tion of a fundamental right to privacy that encompassed the right of 
an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient to refuse life- 
sustaining treatment.185 Although the court stressed that this right 
176. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. 
177. Id. at 39-41, 355 A.2d at 663-64. The court declared that, "no external compel- 
ling interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable, only to vege- 
tate a few measurable months with no realistic possibilty of returning to any semblance 
of cognitive or sapient life." Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663. 
178. Id. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at 668-69. 
179. This would eliminate any possible conflict of interest or concern about profes- 
sional liability, which, the court suggested, might be unconsciously influencing the phy- 
sician's decision to refuse to discontinue medical treatment. Id. at 49-51, 355 A.2d at 
668-70. 
180. Id. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669. 
181. 98 NJ. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
182. Id. at 336-37, 486 A.2d at 1216-17. 
183. Id. at 340,486 A.2d at 1218. Conroy's nephew stated that: " '[all1 [Ms. Conroy 
and her sisters] wanted was to . . . have their bills paid and die in their own house.' " Id. 
(quoting Ms. Conroy's nephew (alterations by the court)). 
184. Id. at 389, 486 A.2d at 1244 (Handler, J., concumng in part and dissenting in 
part). 
185. Id. at 346-50, 486 A.2d at 1221-23. Expanding upon its explication of the 
sources of the right to privacy in Quinlan, this time the court grounded the right to pri- 
vacy in both the federal and New Jersey constitutions and the common law doctrine of 
informed consent. Id. 
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is not absolute, and. may be outweighed by countervailing state in- 
terests,ls6 the court also declared that when the interests of third 
parties were not implicated, "the state's indirect and abstract inter- 
est in preserving the life of the competent patient generally gives 
way to the patient's much stronger personal interest in directing the 
course of his own life."l87 
The Conroy court then confronted squarely the question of how 
decisions should be made on behalf of an incompetent but con- 
scious patient who is hopelessly ill yet not facing imminent death.188 
Reiterating its concern, expressed in Quinhn, that this matter was 
one most appropriate for legislative action, but feeling impelled to 
provide authoritative guidance in its absence, the court articulated 
three separate tests to be applied in the case of such an incompetent 
nursing home patient. 
The first, a subjective test, is consonant with the personal right of 
self-determination sought to be effectuated. This test can be satis- 
fied by clear and convincing evidence that the incompetent patient, 
while competent, expressed a desire not to receive life-sustaining 
medical treatment under the circumstances now existing.189 Such 
evidence may be provided by detailed and specific statements to that 
effect, either written or verbal, a formal living will,l90 or a durable 
power of attorney or other proxy designation of a medical treatment 
agent.lgl 
For situations in which there is inadequate evidence of the incom- 
petent patient's wishes, the court invoked the parens patriae author- 
ity of the state to act humanely to end medical treatment that only 
prolongs a painful dying.lg2 The court articulated two standards for 
determining whether treatment should end absent evidence of the 
patient's wishes: the "limited-objective" test193 and the "pure- 
186. Id. at 348-49,486 A.2d at 1223. Here the court referred to the four state inter- 
ests traditionally recognized: "preserving life, preventing suicide, safeguarding the in- 
tegrity of the medical profession, and protecting innocent third parties." Id. 
187. Id. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223. 
188. The court limited its holding to the incompetent elderly nursing home patient 
who is expected to die within one year even if life-sustaining treatment is continued. Id. 
at 342,486 A.2d at 1219. For a discussion of the particular risks of erroneous decision- 
making for nursing home patients, see supra notes 56-58, infra notes 198-200, and ac- 
companying text. 
189. Id. at 361,486 A.2d at 1229. 
190. The court recognized the evidentiary value of living wills despite the fact that 
they were not legislatively authorized. Id. at 361 n.5, 486 A.2d at 1229 n.5. 
191. Id at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. 
192. Id. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231. 
193. The "limited-objective" test is satisfied, and life-sustaining treatment may be 
terminated or withheld, 
when there is some trustworthy evidence that the patient would have refused 
the treatment, and the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the bur- 
dens of the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the benefits 
of that life for him. mhat is, ] that the patient is suffering, and will continue 
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objective" test.lg4 Under these explicitly "best interests" tests, the 
substituted decisionmaker may authorize the termination of medical 
treatment if the prognosis for the patient's continued existence is 
one of extreme pain, not outweighed by any benefits of pleasureable 
or satisfying interaction with the environment.195 
In so holding, the court took great pains to eschew the notion that 
either of these tests would function as a substituted judgment for 
the incompetent patient. The court stated that: "[Iln the absence of 
adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that the 
right to self-determination serves as the basis for substituted deci- 
sion-making."lg6 Rather, the court viewed the parens patriae justifi- 
cation for state involvement as permitting a decision to end medical 
treatment that merely prolongs suffering, as long as all doubts were 
resolved in favor of continuing life, and no decisions were based on 
the patient's "quality of life."l97 
Recognizing the social and medical isolation of many nursing 
home patients, and the concomitant risks of erroneous diagnosis 
and prognosis, the court devised safeguards against abuse. Under 
the Conroy framework, if a guardian wishes to make a treatment deci- 
sion on his patient's behalf, he must first seek a judicial determina- 
tion of the patient's incompetency to make a treatment decision, 
offering the clear and convincing evidence of at least two physicians 
who have personally examined the patient.lg8 Each situation in 
which a guardian petitions for the termination of life-sustaining 
treatment must be treated as a potential case of abuse, to be investi- 
gated by the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly.199 
to suffer throughout the expected duration of his life, unavoidable pain, and 
that the net burdens of his prolonged life (the pain and suffering of his life 
with the treatment less the amount and duration of pain that the patient 
would likely experience if the treatment were withdrawn) markedly outweigh 
any physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, o r  intellectual satisfaction that 
the patient may still be able to derive from life. 
Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
194. The "pure-objective" test applies in a case where there is no trustworthy evi- 
dence of the patient's wishes and 
the net burdens of the patient's life with the treatment . . . clearly and mark- 
edly outweigh the benefits that the patient derives from life [and] the recur- 
ring, unavoidable and severe pain of the patient's life with the treatment [is] 
such that the effect of administering life-sustaining treatment would be inhu- 
mane. . . . Nevertheless, even in the context of severe pain, life-sustaining 
treatment should not be withdrawn from an incompetent patient who had 
previously expressed a wish to be kept alive in spite of any pain that he might 
experience. 
Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232. 
195. Concumng Justice Handler took issue with the majority's selection of significant 
and recumng pain as the decisive factor in evaluating the relative benefits and burdens 
of prolonging life. He argued that different individuals may place a higher value on not 
being dependent on others o r  avoiding intrusive medical treatment o r  other intrusions 
on one's privacy and dignity, and that these are also important burdens that should be 
balanced against the benefit of continued existence. Id. at 392-99,486 A.2d at 1246-50. 
196. Id. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231. 
197. Id. at 354, 367, 486 A.2d at 1226, 1232-33. 
198. Id. at 381-82, 486 A.2d at 1240-41. 
199. Id. at 374-85,486 A.2d at 1237-42. The office of the Ombudsman for the Insti- 
tutionalized Elderly had previously been created by the New Jersey legislature. N.J. 
STAT. ANN. $ 52:27G-3 (1986). 
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Further, the Ombudsman must gather evidence from two disinter- 
ested physicians, as well as from the patient's attending physician, 
all of whom must agree that the patient's diagnosis and prognosis 
are hopeless. Then, if the guardian, ombudsman, attending physi- 
cian and, in a case in which either the limited-objective or pure-ob- 
jective test is used, the family of the patient, concur, the guardian 
may order that the life-sustaining treatment be removed. Unless 
bad faith is shown, no participant in the decisionmaking process will 
be subject to civil or criminal liability.200 
Most recently, in two cases decided in 1987, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court refined the substitute decisionmaking process for 
incompetent nursing home patients in a persistent vegetative state. 
In the cases of In re Peter201 and In re J o b e ~ , ~ O ~  the court declared that 
such patients, regardless of their life expectancy, would be governed 
by its decision in Quinlan rather than Conroy. Recognizing the possi- 
bility of neglect and abandonment of nursing home patients, and 
thus the need for safeguards against abuse, the court sought to de- 
vise a procedure that promoted the patients' well-being and pro- 
tected them against a hasty or medically incorrect decision to 
terminate treatment, "without unduly burdening their rights to self- 
determination and privacy."203 
Under this if there is clear and convincing evidence of an 
incompetent patient's actual treatment choice, made while compe- 
tent, derived either from a living will, a durable power of attor- 
ney,204 or formal and unequivocal statements to that effect, the 
substitute decisionmaker205 is permitted to authorize the discontin- 
uance of life-sustaining treatment, provided that two neurologists 
and the patient's attending physician agree that the patient is in a 
persistent vegetative state with no possibility of return to a cogni- 
tive, sapient existence. If the nursing home patient is elderly as 
well, the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly must also 
concur, after undertaking an independent investigation for possible 
abuse.206 
If there is no clear and convincing evidence of the patient's 
wishes, as was the case in Jobes,207 then a substitute decisionmaker, 
200. Conroy, 98 N J. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242. 
201. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). 
202. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
203. Id. at 427, 529 A.2d at 451. 
204. The court found that New Jersey's durable power of attorney statute could be 
used as a vehicle for substitute health care decisionmaking, although the statute did not 
expressly authorize such a use. Peter, 108 N.J. at 378-79, 529 A.2d at 426. 
205. This decisionmaker could be either a person designated by the patient, a close 
family member, or a guardian appointed by the court. Id. at 384, 529 A.2d at 429. 
206. Id. 
207. Mary-Ellen Jobes was a thirty-one-year-old woman who had spent seven years in 
a persistent vegetative state following a surgical accident. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401, 
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who may be a close family member208 or a court-appointed 
guardian, may nonetheless make a treatment decision on the pa- 
tient's behalf, based on his evaluation of what the patient would 
have wished to be done under these circumstances.209 
The NewJersey Supreme Court emphasized its strong preference 
that family members, rather than strangers, be the decisionmakers. 
Because they "treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of 
a cause,"210 and because they are " 'most familiar with [the pa- 
tient's] entire Iife context,' " " 'including his or her philosophical, 
religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose of life 
and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sickness, medi- 
cal procedures, suffering and death,' " they are in the best position 
to act as substitute de~isionmakers.2~ As in Peter, the court insisted 
on the safeguards of an independent medical examination by two 
neurologists and the attending physician's concurence in the pa- 
tient's diagnosis and pr0gnosis.~12 
Finally, the court emphasized that judicial review of a decision to 
discontinue life-sustaining treatment was ordinarily neither neces- 
sary nor desirable:2l3 
"No matter how expedited, judicial intervention in this complex 
and sensitive area may take too long. Thus, it could infringe the 
very rights that we want to protect. The mere prospect of a cum- 
bersome, intrusive and expensive court proceeding, during such 
an emotional and upsetting period in the lives of a patient and his 
or her loved ones, would undoubtedly deter many persons from 
deciding to discontinue treatment. And even if the patient or the 
family were willing to submit to such a proceeding, it is likely that 
the patient's rights wouId nevertheless be frustrated by judicial 
deliberation. Too many patients have died before their right to 
reject treatment was vindicated in 
c. Statutes Authorizing Less Formal Decisionmaking 
In addition to the judicially developed models for substitute deci- 
sionmaking, ten states have, by statute, authorized informal 
529 A.2d at 436-38. Although she had made some casual statements over the years 
indicating that she would not want to be maintained in a condition like Karen Ann Quin- 
lan, the court found them insufficiently probative of her preferences to meet the "sub- 
jective" test of substituted judgment. Id. at 409-13, 529 A.2d at 442-43. 
208. The court indicated that a near relative, including a spouse, parent, child, o r  
sibling, would be presumed to be a close relative, interested in the patient's well-being, 
although a physician might also recognize a more distant relative as having a sufficiently 
close personal relationship with the patient to act as her substitute decisionmaker. Id. at 
419, 529 A.2d at 447. 
209. Id. at 399, 529 A.2d at 436-37. 
210. Id. at 416, 529 A.2d at 445. 
2 11. Id. (quoting Newman, Treatment Refiials for the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for the 
Family, the Physician and ihe State, I11 N.Y.L. S C H .  HUM. RIGHTS ANN. 45-46 (1985)). 
212. Id. at 422, 529 A.2d at 448. 
213. The court stated that judicial intervention would be necessary only "[ilf a disa- 
greement arises among the patient, family, guardian, o r  doctors, o r  if there is evidence 
of improper motives or malpractice." Id. at 427-28, 529 A.2d at 451. 
214. Id. at 423, 529 A.2d at 449 (citations omitted) (quoting In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 
335, 357, 529 A.2d 404, 415 (1987)). 
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substitute decisionmaking for incompetent, terminally ill adults215 
as part of their "living will" or "natural death" acts. Recognizing 
that competent adults have the right to "a peaceful and natural 
death,"216 and "to control the decisions relating to their own medi- 
cal care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures 
withheld or withdrawn in instances where such persons are diag- 
nosed as having a terminal and irreversible condition,"217 these stat- 
utes permit a substitute medical treatment decision to be made even 
if the patient has not executed a living will or designated a medical 
treatment agent. Each of the statutes provides that the patient's at- 
tending physician and at least one other person, usually chosen 
from a statutory list in order of priority, shall make the decision to 
end treatment. The Florida statute is typi~al:2~8 It provides that 
life-sustaining treatment may be withheld or withdrawn from an in- 
competent, terminally ill adult following 
consultation and a written agreement for the withholding or with- 
drawal of life-prolonging procedures between the attending phy- 
sician and any of the following individuals, who shall be guided by 
the express or implied intentions of the patient, in the following 
order of priority if no individual in a prior class is reasonably 
available, willing, and competent to act: 
(a) The judicially appointed guardian of the person of the pa- 
tient if such guardian has been appointed. This paragraph shall 
not be construed to require such appointment before a treatment 
decision can be made under this section. 
215. ARK. CODE ANN. 5 20-17-214 (Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 19a-571 
(West Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. 765.07 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. $ 144A.7 
(West Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.58.5(A) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. 5 24-7-8.1 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 90-322 (1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 4590h 4C (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 3 75-2-1 105 (Supp. 1988); 
VA. CODE ANN. 5 54.1-2986 (1988). Of these, both Arkansas and New Mexico provide 
that a substitute decision to forego treatment may be made on behalf of a patient who is 
either terminally ill or in an "irreversible coma," N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 24-7-2(B) (1986), o r  
"permanently unconscious," ARK. STAT. ANN. 5 20-17-201(ii) (Supp. 1987). 
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 90-320(a) (1985). 
217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.58.1(A)(l) (West Supp. 1988). 
218. FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 765.07 (West 1986). 
The Connecticut statute is atypical, providing almost casually for the physician to dis- 
continue life support after consultation with the patient's family. The statute declares 
that any licensed physician or  medical facility 
which removes or causes the removal of a life support system of an incompe- 
tent patient shall not be liable for damages in any civil action or subject to 
prosecution in any criminal proceeding for such removal, provided (1) the 
decision to remove such life support system is based on the best medical 
judgment of the attending physician; (2) the attending physician deems the 
patient to be in a terminal condition; (3) the attending physician has ob- 
tained the informed consent of the next of kin, if known, or legal guardian, if 
any, of the patient prior to removal; and (4) the attending physician has con- 
sidered the patient's wishes as expressed by the patient directly, through his 
next of kin or legal guardian, or in the form of a [living will declaration]. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-571 (West Supp. 1988). 
19891 Heinonline - -  57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 8 3 9  1 9 8 8 - 1 9 8 9  839 
(b) The person or persons designated by the patient in writing 
to make the treatment decision for him should he be diagnosed as 
suffering from a terminal condition. 
(c) The patient's spouse. 
(d) An adult child of the patient or, if the patient has more 
than one adult child, a majority of the adult children who are rea- 
sonably available for consultation. 
(e) The parents of the patient. 
(f) The nearest living relative of the patient.219 
A physician who withholds or withdraws treatment after such con- 
sultation will not be subject to civil or criminal liability or to censure 
for unprofessional conduct.220 AS a precaution against inappropri- 
ate discontinuance of medical treatment, nine of the ten statutes re- 
quire at least one physician in addition to the patient's own doctor 
to certify that the patient is suffering from a terminal condition or 
irreversible coma, or is being kept alive only by extraordinary medi- 
cal means.22 
III. Proposal for Conversation in Decisionmaking 
The autonomy model of substitute decisionmaking for the incur- 
ably ill, incompetent adult, as reflected in both the living will stat- 
utes and the decisions upholding the judicial model for substituted 
judgment, evidences a one-dimensional mode of analysis. In the 
grand vision of the autonomy model it is the individual, armed with 
her rights to privacy and self-determination, who is pitted against 
the state and her physician. Girded with a Lockean view of govern- 
ment as a social contract, in which only limited powers are ceded to 
the state, and wrapped with the magnificent garb of the constitu- 
tional right to privacy, these incompetent, incurably ill individuals 
are now ready to do battle, to insist that they be able to die "with 
their rights on."222 
As has been shown, the consequences of this autonomy model are 
often devastating. Whether it is the judicial model of decision- 
making, exemplified by Massachusetts, which sanctifies the massive 
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. 0 765.07(1) (West 1986). 
220. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 765.10(1) (West 1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
8 40:1299.58.8(A) (West Supp. 1988). 
221. Six of the states-Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Utah-provide explicitly for at least two physicians to concur in judgment of the particu- 
lar medical condition which triggers the operation of the statute. ARK. CODE ANN. 5 20- 
17-203 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 40:1299.58.2(7) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. 
STAT. ANN.,§ 24-7-5 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 90-322(a) (1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. 
ANN. art. 4590h 8 2(6) (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 75-2-1104 (Supp. 
1988). Three states-Florida, Iowa, and Virginia-require such physician concurrence 
in the cases of patients who have executed a living will, and one might argue that princi- 
ples of statutory construction would require at least the same safeguards in the case of 
the patient who had not made an advance directive. FLA. STAT. ANN. 8 765.03(5) (West 
1986); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 144A.5 (West Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. 8 54.1-2982 
(1988). Only one state-Connecticut-has no requirement of physician concurrence. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 3 19a-571 (West Supp. 1988). 
222. Treffert, Dying with Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 104 1 (1973) (letter to 
the editor), reprinted in A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY & THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 690 
(1974). 
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invasion of courts and the media into the private grief and despair of 
families, all in the name of respecting individual freedom, or the 
living will statutes, which purport to respect the right to individual 
autonomy but often render an attempt to exercise that right illusory, 
the autonomy model, with its exclusive emphasis on individual 
rights, is fatally flawed. Thus, one must ask if, in addition to individ- 
ual autonomy, there is not another fundamental aspect of human 
personhood that the law must respect and promote: namely, the 
fact that we are all persons in community, in a network of connec- 
tion and human intera~tion.22~ Rather than seeing each person as a 
bundle of rights, it is much more appropriate to view each of us as a 
member of the human family, and to rely upon principles of familial 
decisionmaking for our moral reference point. 
It is axiomatic that in a family, individuals have responsibilities as 
well as rights. Family members take care of one another, and in par- 
ticular, adult family members care for both the young and the very 
old. In short, in a family, there is the notion of beneficent paternal- 
ism and maternalism. In addition, in many families, it is dicusssion 
and conversation, rather than the authoritarian principle, which is 
the preferred mode for reaching decisions and resolving difficul- 
ties.224 SO too in the area of substitute decisionmaking for incompe- 
tent, incurably ill adults, the law must provide a structure for 
conversations about the treatment choice the incompetent individual 
would make if he were able to communicate with us. In the next 
section, I propose a model for substitute decisionmaking that takes 
into account the need for human connection and compassion, as 
well as the rights of privacy and self-determination. 
A. Sources of the Conversation Model 
The sources of this model are several. Foremost among them is 
Carol Gilligan's book, In a Dzferent Voice, a path-breaking reexamina- 
tion of moral development in American culture. In her book, Gilli- 
gan argues that mature morality is evidenced not only by an 
understanding of rights and rules, and the ability to choose among 
them according to an established hierarchy, but also by the under- 
standing of responsibility and relationships and the ability to act out 
of care and compassion.225 
Gilligan urges that difficult ethical dilemmas should be resolved 
223. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 173, at 19. 
224. One would of course be naive to assert that in families all is always sweetness 
and light, that individual family members invariably act out of altruism and love, rather 
than self interest, or that there is never oppression and dominance, be it economic, 
sexual, or physical. For an excellent analysis of how one's conception of the family is 
inextricably linked to one's view of the appropriateness of different types of state in- 
volvement in medical treatment decisions, see Minow, supra note 59, at 946-50. 
225. See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 173, at 19. 
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not through the rigid application of pre-ordained formulae and 
rules-treating them as "a math problem with human~"~~~-bu t  
rather through a response that will "sustain rather than sever con- 
nection."227 She articulates an alternative structure for conflict res- 
olution in which the "awareness of the connection between people 
gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another."228 
Thus conversation itsegis the answer to the "fracture of human rela- 
tionship," because it sustains and continues "a narrative of relation- 
ships that extend over time."229 In this light, autonomy must be 
seen not as the ultimate virtue, the paramount right, but rather as 
the source of an "illusory and dangerous quest,"230 an obstacle that 
must be overcome, or at least bypassed, if the goal of communal 
caring and compassion is to be attained.231 
From a distinct, but related perspective, Dr. Jay Katz writes in The 
Silent World of Doctor and Patient about the need for physicians to en- 
gage in conversation with their patients as the only way that the 
legal doctrine of informed consent can be rendered meaningful.232 
In Katz's view, if doctors discuss with their patients the risks and 
benefits of alternative treatment, it will both enhance patient auton- 
omy and yield better medical results, because the more information 
the physician has from the patient, the better the diagnosis and 
prognosis he will be able to reach.233 Thus, the practice of conver- 
sation with patients, seeing them not only as the physical embodi- 
ment of a collection of vital signs and symptoms, but as fellow 
beings, both enhances individual self-determination and minimizes 
the risk of an erroneous medical decision.234 
Katz's work in this area finds support in the Society of General 
Internal Medicine's Task Force for the Medical Interview and Re- 
lated Skills. Researchers have found that when physicians are 
trained to ask open-ended questions and to listen attentively, rather 
than subjecting the patient to a verbal diagnostic check list, the re- 
sult is likely to be both better health and a happier relationship be- 
tween the doctor and patient. This happens, first, because in the 
"art" of medicine, "[s]ome . . . healing . . . derives from the simple 
communication of understanding, of positive regard, and of car- 
ing."235 Second, an attentive, open-ended interview leads both to 
greater physician understanding of the patient's illness, desires, and 
expectations, and to increased patient compliance with the physi- 
226. Id. at 28. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at 30. 
229. See id. at 28. 
230. See id. at 48. 
231. Cf: id. at 17-19, 23, 48 (stressing the need to both develop and value the ability 
to care for, and attach to, other human beings). 
232. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATXENT 84 (1984); see abo Katz, 
supra note 84, at 142-43, 147, 160. 
233. J. KATZ, supra note 232, at 86. 
234. Id. at 84. 
235. Lipkin, The Medical Interuiew and Related Skills, in OFFICE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 
1287, 1293 (W. Branch 2d ed. 1987). 
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cian's recommended course of treatment, because the physician 
takes the time to explain the underlying reasons for her recommen- 
dations, and can tailor those recommendations to fit the particular 
needs and habits of her patient.2S6 
The Task Force also found that an emphasis on conversation is 
critical not only for dying patients, but for their families as well. Be- 
ing candid and concrete with the family about the dying process, 
while "[fJraming what is being done as 'care' rather than as 'giving 
up' can transform the experience from a nightmare to a final act of 
love, caring, and courage."237 
Substantial support for a conversation-based model of substitute 
decisionmaking for incompetent patients is also found in the writ- 
ings of Dr. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, who has emphasized that dying is 
a process. Kubler-Ross has found that the dying process consists of 
stages through which an individual patient will often pass, including 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance, and eventual 
peace.238 Each of these stages is an aspect of the conversation in 
which a patient engages with her family, friends, and physicians in 
regard to her impending death. In the case of an incompetent pa- 
tient who cannot communicate with physicians and loved ones, it is 
the process of discussion among the family and doctors, of'taking 
time for mutual and caring interaction, that will lead to a better, 
more humane, decision being made, as well as greater acceptance 
and peace of mind among the participants. 
Finally, the conversation model of substitute decisionmaking finds 
support in the rapidly expanding literature on alternative dispute 
resolution. Alternative dispute resolution, which includes negotia- 
tion, arbitration, and mediation, along with many hybrid f0rms,2~9 is 
seen by its proponents as providing many advantages over litigation 
as a means of resolving controversies. These include: (1) the 
strengthening of ongoing relationships;240 (2) the increased sense of 
self-determination that comes from the disputants working out a 
resolution of a difficult problem t0gether,2~l rather than having it 
imposed from outside, as in adjudication; (3) the enhanced under- 
standing of the other person's situation;242 and (4) the ability to vent 
emotions and to discuss issues not directly related to the dispute at 
hand.243 Each of these advantages supports the conversation model 
236. , Branch, supra note 130, at 359. 
237. Lipkin. supra note 235, at 1303. 
238. See E. K~~BLER-ROSS, ONDEATH AND DYING 38-137 (1970). 
239. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-10 (1985). 
240. Id. at 10. 
241. See id. at 7. 
242. McEwen & Maiman, Small Claim Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 
ME. L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1981). 
243. Id. 
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of substitute decisionmaking. 
First, when the parties to a controversy have an ongoing 
relationship, as is almost always so with family members, and is fre- 
quently the case with the family and the physician, 
it is im~ortant o have the ~arties eek to work out their own solu- 
tion, for such a solution is more likely to be acceptable to them 
than an imposed solution and hence more long-lasting. . . . 
[Mlediation [in particular] encourages a restructuring of the un- 
derlying relationship so as to eliminate or mitigate the source of 
conflict, rather than simply addressing each manifestation of con- 
flict as an isolated event.244 
Second, the enhanced sense of self-determination that can result 
from the participant-controlled give-and-take of alternative dispute 
resolution has a twofold virtue: it comports with the autonomy 
model's goal of achieving individual self-actualization and it also 
leads to greater satisfaction on the part of all participants with the 
resolution that is ultimately reached. 
A recent study of small claims court mediation in Maine found 
that those persons who participated in mediation, and thus played 
an active part in the decisionmaking process, were much more satis- 
fied with the ultimate result and more likely to adhere to the deci- 
sion reached than were traditional litigants, who often viewed 
themselves as the mere object of the judge's dec i~ ionmak ing .~~~  The 
authors of the study suggested that, in part, this enhanced partici- 
pant support for a decision reached via alternative dispute resolu- 
tion may stem from the opportunities that mediation provides for 
gaining insight into the other party's situation and the validity of his 
viewpoint. In addition, because it is a less structured process than 
adjudication, mediation gives the parties the chance to air important 
emotional concerns and to discuss other issues which might not be 
considered legally relevant.24G Hence, although mediation took 
slightly more time than adjudication, it also led to increased satisfac- 
tion with the decisionmaking process, greater compliance with the 
settlement eventually reached, and the continuation of the parties' 
long-term, ongoing relationship when one existed.247 
B. The Conversation Model in Practice 
In the case of substitute decisionmaking for the incompetent, in- 
curably ill adult, an alternative dispute resolution process holds out 
the same potential for continuing and strengthening the relation- 
ship of the participants, increasing satisfaction and compliance with 
the resolution reached, and helping the parties deal with the sadness 
and emotional upheaval that inevitably attends a decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from a hopelessly 
ill individual. These advantages are present in the procedure 
244. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, supra note 239, at 10. 
245. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 242, at 263-64. 
246. Id. at 239, 256. 
247. Id. at 263-64. 
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envisioned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in C o n r ~ y , ~ ~ ~  Peter,249 
andJobes,250 in the process by which a designated treatment agent 
discusses the patient's condition and prognosis with the attending 
physician,25' and, to a limited extent, in the provisions for less for- 
mal decisionmaking enacted by ten states in their natural death 
acts.252 
In order to achieve a viable process of decisionmaking for the in- 
curably ill, incompetent patient based on conversation, mutual re- 
spect, and responsibility, a number of changes-legal and medical- 
must occur. First and foremost, state legislatures must be per- 
suaded to enact statutes permitting competent adults to designate a 
medical treatment agent to make decisions on their behalf should 
they become incompetent and incurably ill. Such laws promote in- 
dividual self-determination and autonomy by permitting the compe- 
tent adult to nominate in advance of illness and incompetency a 
treatment agent whom she trusts to make decisions for her based on 
the agent's knowledge of her life, moral values, and preferences. 
The advance designation of such a treatment agent leads both to 
peace of mind on the part of the competent adult, and at the same 
time enhances the accuracy of the treatment decision that is made. 
Because the treatment agent must engage in conversation with the 
patient's physician concerning the patient's present condition and 
long-run prognosis, all relevant information can be brought to bear 
in the decisionmaking process. The treatment decision that the 
physician and the treatment agent ultimately make can therefore be 
tailored both to the patient's medical situation and her moral value 
system. 
It is critical that the designated treatment agent be authorized to 
act on the patient's behalf whenever he is incompetent and incur- 
ably ill. As noted earlier,253 to require that a patient be terminally ill 
before his living will or other advance treatment directive can be- 
come operative deprives many hopelessly ill people of the salutary 
effects of an advance directive, condemning them to a prolonged 
and often painful dying process. 
At the same time, legislatures should enact substitute decision- 
making procedures for those patients who have not executed an 
advance treatment directive. Such procedures should be simple and 
informal, as in those states whose natural death acts currently 
provide for such a procedure.254 However, these procedures should 
248. 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
249. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987). 
250. 108 NJ. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
251. See supra notes 131-43 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra notes 215-21 and accompanying text. 
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also be accompanied by safeguards, like those enunciated by the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in Conroy 255 andJobes, 25G that will ensure 
that an accurate diagnosis and prognosis has been made, that the 
family is truly representing the patient's interests, and that those pa- 
tients without close family members or  friends to act on their behalf 
are not abandoned.257 At the same time, these procedures, like the 
statutes authorizing the designation of a medical treatment agent, 
should be be broad enough to include all incurably ill patients, not 
only those whose conditions meet a strict definition of "terminal 
illness." 
Such a comprehensive, informal substitute decisionmaking proce- 
dure, with adequate safeguards against ill-advised, uninformed, or 
improperly motivated substitute decisions, serves all the goals of the 
conversation model. It is private, it is capable of a speedier and yet 
more complete resolution of the issue, and it permits more give- 
and-take, more development of understanding in reaching a deci- 
sion. Because each member of the decisionmaking group is better 
informed about the ingredients of the decision, the risk of errone- 
ous decisionmaking is significantly redu~ed.25~ This in turn leaves 
the participants more satisfied, and thus, more likely to comply with 
the decision that is reached. One can only wonder what would have 
happened in the Brophy case if Patricia Brophy and her husband's 
physicians had spent more time talking and less time litigating. 
Would not the precise result the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court reached-recognition of Brophy's right to refuse treatment 
and his transfer to the care of physicians who were willing to remove 
his gastrostomy tube-have been achieved earlier, and at much less 
financial and emotional cost to all persons involved? 
As a result of a shared decisionmaking process, individual partici- 
pants are able to view each other not as adversaries, but as partners 
in reaching the resolution of a difficult problem. Then, after a deci- 
sion is made, there is not enmity, but connection. This paves the 
way for future relations of mutual respect, rather than malpractice 
litigation, or rifts within the family. Accordingly, just as is the case 
with alternative dispute resolution, the process of conversation, of 
structuring a decisionmaking model on the basis of human connec- 
tion rather than on a hierachy of rights and rules, enhances both the 
quality of the decision made and the participants' acceptance of it. 
In addition to legislative changes permitting conversational deci- 
sionmaking, medical education also must become more sensitive to 
the ethical issues involved in making decisions for the incurably ill, 
and more responsive to the need for conversation in the process of 
255. 98 NJ. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985). 
256. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987). 
257. Corzroq, 98 N.J. at 374-85, 486 A.2d at 1237-42; see also supra notes 198-209 and 
accompanying text. However, i t  would not seem necessary to appoint a guardian in the 
ordinary case. Seee.g., In re Barry, 445 So. 2d 365,372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (stating 
that in the case of a young child, the parents need not always qualify as legal guardians; 
the parents' decision, supported by competent medical advice, is ordinarily sufficient). 
258. See Branch, supra note 130, at 359. 
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reaching those decisions. In particular, medical schools must con- 
front directly the difficulties that inhere in our classical hierarchical 
relationship between doctor and patient. Just as the doctrine of 
informed consent has as its goal greater participation by the patient 
in his own medical care as a means of achieving more medically cor- 
rect and more personally satisfying decisions, so too we must instill 
in medical students and practicing physicians the need to be open in 
discussing the difficult issues of death and dying, to take time with 
the incurably ill patient and his family, and to actively involve them 
in the decisionmaking process.259 
Instead of relegating medical ethics, psychosocial aspects of pa- 
tient care, and the art and science of the medical interview to a mi- 
nor, elective place in the curriculum, medical schools must give 
these subjects a place in student studies commensurate with their 
importance in the practice of medicine, integrating them fully into 
the curr ic~lum.2~~ Exemplifying the type of curricular change that 
is both necessary and possible, in 1988 Harvard University Medical 
School introduced a mandatory, comprehensive first-year course ad- 
dressing numerous issues in the doctor-patient relationship, includ- 
ing informed consent, the patient interview, and ethical issues in 
death and dying.Z61 
Concomitantly with this new emphasis on the psychosocial as- 
pects of climate practice, medical schools must also inform their stu- 
dents about the legal aspects of substitute decisionmaking for the 
incurably ill. Both students and practicing physicians must be 
taught about living wills, advance designations of medical treatment 
agents, and, other legal tools available to enhance the patient's 
control over his own dying whenever possible.262 
259. This is but one of many reasons why it is appropriate to rethink our private and 
state financial mechanisms for physician reimbursement, so that doctors are able to 
charge a reasonable fee for the time involved in making decisions to withdraw or with- 
hold life-sustaining treatment. In addition, Dr. William T. Branch, one of the leading 
proponents of the attentive, open-ended interview, argues that not only must physicians 
find the time to engage in real conversation with patients and their families, but that 
such time is actually cost-effective. He notes 
[Olnce these skills are practiced-and become truly integrated into the doc- 
tor's repertoire--enhanced interest in and ability to deal with patients' feel- 
ings saves time in the long run, because patients talk to their doctors more 
freely and cooperatively, their expectations are more fully met, compliance 
improves, and misunderstandings and disagreements lessen. 
Branch, srcpra note 130, at 358-59. 
260. Since the early 1980s, the impetus for reform of American medical education 
has grown. Critics generally agree on what is wrong with modem medical education, 
although they often have disparate views on how best to remedy these deficiencies. See 
Bok, srlpra note 32, at 32, 34-45, 70. 
261. Telephone interview with Dr. William Branch, Harvard University Medical 
School (July 25, 1988). This new course accounts for 66 hours in the reformed medical 
school curriculum, compared with one hour previously. 
262. Nursing educators must make similar curricular changes, as nurses are the pri- 
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It is also necessary for members of the public, as well as lawyers 
and health care professionals, to educate themselves about the 
advantages of designating a treatment agent to make health care de- 
cisions. Competent adults need to plan for their dying and discuss 
their treatment preferences openly, in advance of illness and incom- 
petency, with close friends and family. By encouraging such conver- 
sation, we can also foster both individual dignity and human 
connection and caring. 
Finally, and most important, the judiciary must take a hands-off 
approach. Our zeal for error-free decisionmaking should not lead 
us to believe that judicial intrusion in this area is either inevitable, 
infallible, or desirable. Ultimately, we must recognize that the 
courts are simply not the place for resolution of these most intimate 
and personal issues. It is not judges but family members, acting out 
of compassion, not dispassion, who are the most appropriate per- 
sons to ease their loved ones' passage from life to death. 
mary caregivers in the hospital setting, almost always having much more contact with the 
patient and his family than the physician. 
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